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iii)	 The	 need	 to	 strike	 a	 balance	 when	 imposing	 accounting	
duties	........................................................................................	90	






















Micro,	 small	 and	medium	 enterprises	 (“MSMEs”)	 constitute	 the	
bulk	 and	 beating	 heart	 of	 virtually	 all	 of	 the	world’s	 economies.	
They	 are	 a	 primary	 means	 by	 which	 entrepreneurs	 bring	 new	
business	propositions	to	the	market,	and	deliver	a	range	of	prod-
ucts	 and	 services	 to	 local	 economies.1	They	 often	 constitute	 the	




Whereas	 larger	businesses	tend	to	be	robust	 in	a	variety	of	 legal	
and	 regulatory	 climates,	MSMEs’	 ability	 to	 survive	 and	 thrive	 is	
highly	 sensitive	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 their	 environment.	 Insolvency	
regimes,	 in	particular,	can	have	profound	effects	on	whether	the	
social	 wealth	 that	 MSMEs	 represent	 is	 increased,	 preserved,	 or	
destroyed;	and	on	the	fairness	with	which	that	wealth	and	those	
losses	 are	 distributed.	 There	 are	 knock-on	 secondary	 effects	 on	
the	efficiency	with	which	an	economy’s	commercial	lending	sector	
can	work	through	distressed	assets,	and,	in	turn,	on	that	sector’s	




funds	 of	 the	 entrepreneur	 no	 longer	 suffice	 to	meet	 the	 enter-
prise’s	 growth	 potential.	 Another	 is	 when	 the	 MSME	 lacks	 the	
resources,	 financial	 or	 technical,	 to	 weather	 a	 crisis.	 A	 third	 is	
when	the	business	has	failed,	often	leaving	 its	entrepreneur	per-
sonally	 burdened	 with	 its	 obligations.	 An	 efficacious	 insolvency	
regime	would	sift	through	distressed	businesses	to	identify	those	
that	 remain	 viable,	 and	 would	 provide	 cost-effective	 means	 for	
















be	met,	 and	 promptly	 returned	 to	 economic	 productivity.	 There	
would	be	due	accountability	 for	any	wrongdoing	connected	with	
the	insolvency.		
Historically,	 insolvency	 systems	 have	 been	 designed	 with	 larger	
enterprises	 in	mind.	They	assume	an	extensive	 insolvency	estate	
of	 significant	 worth,	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 creditors	 and	 other	
stakeholders	with	sufficient	value	at	stake	that	they	participate	in	
and	 oversee	 the	 process.	 These	 assumptions	 undergird	 mecha-
nisms	by	which	creditors	and	other	stakeholders	may	ensure	that	




of	 MSMEs.	 Mirroring	 the	 general	 population	 of	 businesses	 and	
reflecting	the	particular	fragility	associated	with	smaller	asset	ba-
ses	and	relative	absence	of	risk	diversification,	the	vast	majority	of	
businesses	 entering	 insolvency	 proceedings	 are	 MSMEs.	 On	
MSME	insolvency,	little	or	no	value	is	available	for	distribution	to	
anyone	other	than	secured	creditors	in	a	significant	proportion	of	
insolvency	 estates,	 and	 secured	 creditors	 tend	 to	 have	 effective	
collection	 methods	 under	 non-insolvency	 law.	 Correspondingly,	
most	 secured	 and	 unsecured	 creditors,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 stake-
holders,	 are	 rationally	disinterested	 in	 the	 insolvency	process.	 In	
many	 cases,	 it	 is	 not	 worthwhile	 for	 either	 the	 estate	 or	 most	




the	nature	of	most	of	 the	businesses	 to	which	 they	apply	 leaves	
the	insolvency	process	unbalanced,	inadequately	supervised,	non-
efficacious,	and	sometimes,	simply	unfeasible.	Policy-makers	and	
legislators	have	often	 responded	 through	ad	hoc	 changes	 to	 the	
‘standard’	 regime,	 such	as	by	 shearing	 some	elements	of	 the	 in-
solvency	process	when	applied	to	smaller	businesses,	by	shorten-
ing	statutory	timelines,	and	by	dispensing	with	the	necessary	par-
ticipation	 of	 certain	 stakeholders.	 The	 resulting	 processes	 have	





ically	 rethinks	 the	 treatment	of	MSME	 insolvency.	 It	 shares	with	




countability	 for	 any	 wrongdoing	 connected	 with	 the	 insolvency,	
and	 enabling	 discharge	 of	 over-indebted	 natural	 persons.	 The	
Modular	Approach	differs	 in	the	way	 it	pursues	these	objectives.	
Its	basic	assumption	 is	 that	 the	parties	 to	a	particular	 insolvency	
case	are	best	placed	to	select	the	tools	appropriate	to	that	case.	
The	role	of	the	legal	regime	should	be	to	provide	these	tools	in	a	
maximally	 flexible	way,	while	 creating	 the	 correct	 incentives	 for	
their	deployment.		
Traditionally,	 insolvency	 regimes	provide	particular	 ‘packages’	or	




obtain	 discharge	 of	 any	 unrepayable	 obligations.	 The	 entrepre-
neur	may	 access	 any	 of	 the	 full	 range	 of	 insolvency	 law	mecha-
nisms	to	enable	attainment	of	these	objectives.	At	the	same	time,	
creditors	and	other	stakeholders	have	the	right	to	adequate	noti-











The	Modular	 Approach	 also	 responds	 to	 differences	 in	 the	 eco-
nomic,	 social	 and	 legal	 circumstances	 of	 different	 countries.	 It	
does	so	by	guiding	national	policymakers	with	respect	to	the	fac-
tors	 relevant	 to	 determining	 the	 proper	 boundaries	 between	
‘standard’	and	MSME	insolvency	regimes,	and	by	identifying	three	
functions:	management,	administrative	and	judicial.	The	approach	






neurs	have	positive	 incentives	 to	 commence	 the	 insolvency	pro-
cess	in	a	timely	manner:	they	do	not	have	to	declare	the	business	
insolvent;	they	may,	in	principle,	retain	its	management;	and	they	
have	 the	 right	 to	 propose	 how	 the	 insolvency	 should	 proceed.	
Entrepreneurs	also	face	negative	 incentives	that	discourage	non-
timely	 commencement	 of	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 in	 that	 the	
Modular	 Approach	 imposes	 personal	 liability	 for	 any	 additional	
loss	 suffered	by	 the	business’	 creditors	because	of	blameworthy	
delay	 in	 commencement.	 The	 Modular	 Approach	 acknowledges	
that	in	many	MSME	insolvencies,	unsecured	creditors	are	rational-
ly	disinterested,	given	 their	 limited	economic	 stake	and	 the	very	
limited	 likelihood	of	 any	 recovery	 in	 the	process.	 They	need	not	
actively	participate	 in	 the	process	 if,	 upon	due	notification,	 they	
do	not	consider	it	worth	the	time	and	expense	of	participating.	As	
noted,	 their	 abstention	 is	 deemed	 approval,	 and	 the	 insolvency	




tion	 of	 the	 claims	 against	 the	 enterprise,	 to	 override	 the	 entre-
preneur’s	choice	of	tools	and	to	select	a	destiny	for	the	business	




the	place	of	MSMEs	 in	 the	global	economy,	 including	 challenges	
for	defining	MSMEs,	and	the	significance	of	MSME	economic	ac-
tivity.	Part	III	examines	the	particular	needs	of	MSMEs	in	financial	







viable	 businesses,	 the	 liquidation	 of	 non-viable	 businesses,	 and	
the	 devolvement	 of	 choice	 on	 stakeholders	 with	 the	 best	 infor-
mation	 and	 most	 appropriate	 incentives	 for	 value-maximizing	
outcomes.	Part	V	canvasses	in	detail	the	design	of	a	Modular	Ap-





resolving	MSME	 insolvency	and	 for	 the	 involvement	of	appropri-
ate	 institutions.	 Finally,	 Part	 VI	 discusses	 the	 implementation	 of	
the	 Modular	 Approach,	 including	 the	 position	 of	 various	 stake-
holder	 groups	 involved,	 and	 the	 regulatory	 and	 implementation	
challenges	 that	 insolvency	 systems	may	 face	when	 applying	 the	
Modular	Approach.	The	 report	 includes	an	Annex	with	 summary	




en	 scholars	 in	 six	 jurisdictions	and	one	member	of	 the	Canadian	
judiciary.	 	 In	 formulating	 the	 ideas	 and	 proposals,	 we	met	 as	 a	
group	 four	 times	 during	 2015-6	 in	 Madrid	 Spain,	 Bowen	 Island	
Canada,	 London	 UK	 and	 Tokyo	 Japan.	 The	 report	 draws	 on	 and	












of	business	 include,	 among	others,	 annual	 gross	or	net	 revenue,	
value	of	assets	and/or	liabilities,	value	of	sales,	legal	structure,	or	



































































































size.	 The	 most	 common	 among	 the	 three	 is	 the	 number-of-
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are	 likely	 the	 most	 accurate	 parameters	 to	 define	 an	 SME,	 but	
these	data	are	not	always	available	from	lenders.	They	note	that	
while	banks	may	collect	this	information	at	the	time	of	evaluating	
loan	 applications,	 they	 often	 do	 not	 retain	 it	 in	 their	 systems.6	
Their	study	found	that	some	countries	choose	to	rely	on	loan	size	
as	a	proxy	 for	MSME	finance.	Financial	Access	2010	 reports	 that	
only	15	countries	use	loan	size	as	relevant	to	defining	an	SME;	and	
within	this	criterion,	there	 is	considerable	variation	among	coun-






different	definitions	 for	different	purposes.	 In	Canada,	 for	exam-
ple,	Industry	Canada	defines	small	business	as	in	the	chart	above,	
reporting	 that	98	percent	of	 the	1.08	million	 small	businesses	 in	
Canada	 in	 2013	 had	 1	 to	 99	 employees.9	In	 contrast,	 Canada’s	
Office	of	the	Superintendent	of	Bankruptcy	(“OSB”)	defines	busi-






























of	MSME	activity.	 For	example,	 the	OHADA	countries	 (Organisa-
tion	 pour	 l'Harmonisation	 en	Afrique	 du	Droit	 des	 Affaires)	 have	
introduced	new	terminology	 for	small	entrepreneurs	 in	an	effort	
to	 promote	 migration	 of	 informal	 businesses	 into	 the	 formal	
MSME	sector.12	With	support	 from	the	World	Bank	Group,	OHA-














11	For	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 Canadian	 treatment	 of	MSME,	 see	 Janis	 Sarra,	 “An	
Opportune	Moment	—	Retooling	the	Bankruptcy	and	Insolvency	Act	to	Address	
Micro,	Small	and	Medium	Enterprise	(MSME)	Insolvency	in	Canada,	in	JP	Sarra	

















may	 not	 be	 incorporated.	 Incorporation	 of	 the	 micro	 business	
typically	 occurs	 because	 someone	 has	 advised	 the	 entrepreneur	
that	 incorporation	would	 better	 protect	 the	 entrepreneur’s	 per-
sonal	assets.	This	protection,	 in	reality,	 is	partial	only.	 Incorpora-





debt	with	personal	 assets.16	Such	 guarantees	 effectively	blur	 the	
distinction	 between	 personal	 and	 business	 debt.	 It	 follows,	 as	 a	
matter	of	 practical	 necessity,	 that	 a	 regime	governing	MSME	 in-
solvency	would	often	be	 required	 to	address	 the	entrepreneur’s	
personal	 liability.	 For	 the	 same	 reasons,	 a	MSME	 insolvency	 re-
gime	would	have	 to	 address	 the	entrepreneur’s	 non-business	or	
‘consumer’	 obligations	 as	 well.	 The	 boundary	 between	 business	
and	consumer	obligations	is	often	vague	–	as	when	personal	cred-
it	 card	 loans	 are	 invested	 in	 the	business	 –	 and	 it	would	not	 be	
cost-effective	 to	 distinguish	 between	 them	 by	 investigating	 the	
purposes	 for	which	a	 loan	was	made	and/or	 the	way	 in	which	 it	
was	spent.	 In	any	case,	a	regime	that	provided	differential	 treat-
ment	 for	 obligations	 depending	 on	 the	 purposes	 for	which	 they	
were	 incurred	 would	 create	 perverse	 incentives	 for	 the	 obliga-
tions	to	be	disguised.	The	sensible	response	is	to	enable	a	MSME	
insolvency	regime	to	deal	with	all	the	debts	of	the	natural	person	
entrepreneur.	 	 The	 definition	 and	 character	 of	MSMEs	 are	 that	





MSMEs,	 there	 is	 no	 denying	 their	 immense	 significance	 to	 the	
global	 economy.	 They	 are	 a	 major	 source	 of	 jobs,	 economic	








Area	 alone	 has	 approximately	 20	million	MSMEs,18	and	 over	 the	
2004	 to	 2006	 period,	 small	 and	 medium-sized	 enterprises	
(“SMEs”)	were	 the	 primary	 drivers	 of	 economic	 growth.19	In	 the	
United	 States,	 SMEs	make	 up	 99	 percent	 of	 all	 firms,20		 employ	
over	 50	 percent	 of	 private	 sector	 employees,	 and	 generate	 65	
percent	 of	 net	 new	 private	 sector	 jobs.21	Similarly,	 UK	 MSMEs	
account	for	99.9%	of	the	country’s	businesses,	provide	60%	of	all	
private	sector	employment,	and	account	for	47%	of	private	sector	
turnover.22	The	 immense	 significance	 of	 MSMEs	 to	 the	 US	 and	
European	 economies	 is	 broadly	 representative	 of	 the	 global	 pic-
ture.		
Kushnir	et	al	report	that	there	are	125	million	“formal”	MSMEs	in	
132	 countries	 for	 which	 data	 are	 collected	 by	 the	 International	
Finance	Corporation	(“IFC”),	including	89	million	in	emerging	mar-
kets.23	Formal	MSMEs	 are	more	 common	 in	 high-income	 econo-
mies,	but	in	low-and	middle-income	economies,	MSME	density	is	
rising	 at	 a	 faster	 pace.24	The	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 formal	
MSMEs	 globally,	 83	 percent,	 are	 micro	 enterprises.25	The	 data	



































economies	 is	 at	 a	 similar	 level	 to	 that	 for	 Latin	America	and	 the	




















ated	 in	 Canada.33	In	 the	 European	 Union,	 9.4	 million	 jobs	 were	
created	 in	 the	MSME	sector	 in	27	European	Union	countries	be-
tween	 2002	 and	 2008.34	From	 a	 regional	 perspective,	 East	 Asia	
and	 the	 Pacific	 have	 the	 highest	 ratio	 of	MSME	 employment	 to	
total	employment,	driven	 largely	by	China,	where	formal	MSMEs	




























MSMEs	are	particularly	 vulnerable	 to	macroeconomic	and	 finan-
cial	 shocks,	observing	 that	MSME	 insolvencies	 in	Denmark,	 Italy,	
Spain,	 and	 Ireland	 exceeded	 25	 percent	 in	 2007-2008.38	A	 US	































also	 tend	 to	 be	 overrepresented	 in	 economic	 sectors	 character-
ized	by	discretionary	 spending,	 such	as	hospitality	 and	 construc-
tion.	They	may	lack	suitable	internal	governance	mechanisms,	and	




ings,	 failure	 to	 prevent	 further	 downward	 spiralling	 of	 finances,	
failure	 to	 deal	with	 operational	 and	 financial	 deficiencies,	 and	 a	
lack	of	resources	to	hire	effective	expertise	to	deal	with	the	insol-
vency.	 Such	 diseconomies	 of	 small	 scale	 likely	 explain	 MSMEs’	
particular	vulnerability	to	insolvency.	
In	 addition	 to	 internal	 factors	 contributing	 to	 financial	 distress,	
there	are	also	issues	external	to	the	MSME	itself,	in	particular,	the	
issue	 of	 the	 obligations	 of	 institutional	 lenders	 vis-a-vis	MSME	
finance,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Part	 VI.B.1,	 “Creditor	 Behaviour	 at	 the	
Origin	and	Restructuring	of	Credit”.		
B. THE	IMPORTANCE	OF	INSOLVENCY	LAW	
Insolvency	 regimes	 that	 are	 responsive	 to	 the	 needs	 of	MSMEs	
are	particularly	important.	Insolvency	law	is	broadly	recognized	as	
























of	 collateral. 44 	Such	 mechanisms	 can	 also	 offer	 an	 effective	
framework	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 business	 activity.45	Credible	
restructuring	schemes	can	ensure	that	businesses	with	viable	go-
ing-forward	 business	 plans	 can	 survive,	 in	 turn	 preserving	 jobs,	
supply	contracts,	customer	goodwill,	and	economic	stability	more	
generally.46	From	 a	 macro	 financial	 perspective,	 effective	 insol-
vency	laws	enable	financial	institutions	to	resolve	problem	assets	
more	 efficaciously,	 thereby	 freeing	 up	 provisioning	 resources,	
strengthening	 investors’	 perception	 of	 financial	 sector	 stability,	
pro	 tanto	 improving	 banks’	 ability	 to	 lend,	 and	 thus	 particularly	
benefitting	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises	 in	 many	 economies	
where	such	businesses	are	particularly	dependent	on	bank	fund-
ing.47	The	World	Bank	has	observed	that	effective	insolvency	sys-




and	 informal	 societal	 rules	and	practice	norms	 that	affect	entre-
preneurs,	 including	 the	design	of	 bankruptcy	 laws,	 the	 structure	
of	 capital	markets,	 and	 the	 perception	 of	 stigma	 related	 to	 per-
sonal	 responsibility.49	Cost-effective	 insolvency	 proceedings	 can	
encourage	 inefficient	 firms	 to	 exit,	 encourage	 greater	 entrepre-
























returns	 to	 creditors.50	Timely	 resolution	 of	 financial	 distress	 can	
reduce	uncertainty	for	entrepreneurs,	creditors	and	management,	






The	 efforts	 of	 organizations	 such	 as	 UNCITRAL	 and	 the	 World	
Bank	have	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 creating	model	 insolvency	
legislation,	 best	 practice	 guidance,	 and	 to	 helping	 governments	
implement	reforms.53	The	effectiveness	of	insolvency	laws	never-
theless	varies	among	countries	around	the	world.54	According	to	a	
survey	 on	 debt	 enforcement	 in	 88	 countries,	 referenced	 by	 a	
World	 Bank	 Research	 Paper,	 bankruptcy	 procedures	 are	 time-
consuming,	 costly	 and	 inefficient	 in	 being	 able	 to	 preserve	 the	
business	as	a	going	concern;	in	only	36	percent	of	countries	is	the	
business	preserved	as	a	going	concern;	and	an	average	of	48	per-
cent	 of	 the	 business’s	 value	 is	 lost	 in	 debt	 enforcement.55	The	
World	 Bank	 Group	 Doing	 Business	 report	 for	 2014	 found	 that	
among	 38	 selected	 indicators/measures	 of	 the	 regulatory	 and	
institutional	 environment,	 the	 secured	 creditor	 recovery	 rate	 in	
distress	scenarios	was	the	single	most	valuable	measure.56		
The	 World	 Bank	 also	 examined	 MSMEs	 that	 had	 defaulted	 on	
























est	 rates,	 although	 reorganization	 reform	 had	 the	 opposite	 ef-
fect.57	Moreover,	a	research	study	for	the	International	Monetary	
Fund	 reports	 that	 six	 years	 since	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 the	
problems	 of	 high	 levels	 of	 corporate	 debt	 and	 nonperforming	
loans	 (“NPLs”)	 persist	 in	 several	 European	 countries.58	It	 found	
that	 SMEs	 in	general	 are	more	 leveraged	and	 reliant	on	bank	 fi-
nancing	 than	 large	 firms	 and	 have	 significantly	 higher	 non-
performing	 loan	(“NPL”)	ratios.	 It	also	 found	that	given	the	 large	
number	of	SMEs,	their	small	size	and	heavy	reliance	on	collateral,	
SME	 loan	 restructuring	 is	more	 costly	 and	 riskier	 for	 large	 firms	
than	 for	 banks,	 and	 current	 frameworks	 are	 ill-suited	 for	 SMEs,	









various	 jurisdictions	 is	 highly	problematic	 for	 the	 types	of	 issues	
facing	MSMEs.	One	size	does	not	fit	all.	
Often,	on	MSME	insolvency,	there	are	few	or	no	assets	to	realize.	




As	noted	above,	 the	owners	of	 small	 businesses	usually	need	 to	
secure	business	loans	with	their	personal	assets	or	personal	guar-
antees,	 creating	 a	 convergence	 and	 blurring	 of	 distinctions	 be-
















experienced.61	Evidence	 suggests	 that	 exactly	 the	 opposite	 ap-
proach	better	serves	standard	public	policy	objectives.	One	study	
that	 compared	 self-employment	 in	 15	 countries	 in	 Europe	 and	
North	America	from	1990-2005	found	that	the	more	forgiving	the	
personal	 bankruptcy	 laws,	measured	 particularly	 in	 reference	 to	
the	time	a	bankrupt	individual	has	to	wait	to	be	discharged	from	
pre-bankruptcy	debts,	combined	with	ready	access	to	 limited	lia-






nism	 for	MSME	 businesses	 under	 Division	 II	 consumer	 proposal	
provisions	of	the	BIA,	which	are	accessible	to	self-employed	indi-
viduals	 and	 sole	 proprietors	 whose	 debts	 are	 less	 than	 250,000	
CAD,	excluding	a	mortgage	or	hypothec	on	the	individual’s	princi-

























have	 a	 loan	 or	 line	 of	 credit.67	The	 survey	 results	 revealed	 that	
well-designed	insolvency	 laws	are	a	factor	 in	accessing	credit,	di-
rectly	related	to	creditor	confidence	in	the	ability	to	recover.68	In	
turn,	 access	 to	 credit	 can	 assist	with	 fostering	 entrepreneurship	
and	the	creation	of	new	business	activity.	
D. THE	INTERNATIONAL	REGULATORY	AND	POLICY	CONTEXT	
Internationally,	 there	 are	 currently	 insufficient	 tools	 to	 address	
MSME	 insolvency.	 	UNCITRAL,	which	has	 led	 international	policy	
development	in	the	insolvency	area,	only	makes	brief	mention	of	
small	 businesses	 in	 its	 four-part	 Legislative	 Guide	 on	 Insolvency	
Law. 69 	The	 Legislative	 Guide	 is	 aimed	 at	 providing	 a	
comprehensive	 statement	 of	 the	 key	 objectives	 and	 principles	
that	 should	 be	 reflected	 in	 a	 State's	 insolvency	 laws.	 	 While	 it	
provides	 a	 valuable	 reference	 tool	 for	 national	 legislative	
authorities	 in	 reviewing	 the	 adequacy	 of	 their	 laws	 and	






particular	 challenges	 facing	 MSME	 that	 are	 highlighted	 in	 this	
report,	 aside	 from	brief	 note	 that	 the	 costs	 and	 fees	 associated	
with	 accessing	 insolvency	 proceedings	 may	 be	 of	 particular	 im-
portance	in	the	case	of	small-	and	medium-size	businesses.71			
	
Part	 two	 of	 the	 Legislative	Guide	 deals	with	 core	 features	 of	 an	







69	UNCITRAL	 Legislative	 Guide	 on	 Insolvency	 Law,	 Parts	 One	 and	 Two	 (2004,)	
UNCITRAL	 Legislative	 Guide	 on	 Insolvency	 Law,	 Part	 Three	 (2010).	 UNCITRAL	
Legislative	 Guide	 on	 Insolvency	 Law,	 Part	 Four	 (2013).	 The	 Legislative	 Guide,	






criteria,	 stays,	 post-commencement	 finance,	 participation	 of	
creditors,	expedited	reorganization	proceedings,	simplified	claims	
procedures,	conversion	of	reorganization	to	liquidation,	and	clear	
rules	 for	 discharge	 of	 the	 debtor	 and	 closure	 of	 insolvency	

























system	 recognizes	 both	 consumer	 and	 business	 debt,	 it	
may	not	be	feasible	to	have	rules	on	the	business	debts	of	
natural	 persons	 that	 differ	 from	 the	 rules	 applicable	 to	
consumer	debts.73	
	
Part	 three	 of	 the	 Legislative	 Guide	 addresses	 the	 treatment	 of	
enterprise	 groups	 in	 insolvency,	 both	 nationally	 and	
internationally;	 it	 is	 not	 directly	 applicable	 to	 the	 overwhelming	
majority	of	MSMEs	and	 there	 is	 no	 specific	 reference	 to	 smaller	









family	 members	 and	 senior	 employees	 of	 small	 family-owned	
companies	being	considered	de	 facto	directors,	 some	criteria	 for	
that	assessment,	and	potential	resultant	liability.74		The	UNCITRAL	
Model	 Law	 on	 Cross-Border	 Insolvency	 (1997)	 and	 its	 Guide	 to	
Enactment	make	no	reference	to	MSME.			
	
Hence,	 the	UNCITRAL	 legislative	 guides	 and	other	policies,	while	
comprehensive,	 reflect	 very	much	 how	 insolvency	 systems	 have	
been	 designed	 in	 many	 States.	 	 As	 noted	 earlier	 in	 this	 report,	
such	systems	have	been	designed	with	larger	enterprises	in	mind,	
assuming	an	insolvency	estate	of	significant	worth,	and	the	pres-








dressed	 in	 the	 Legislative	 Guide	 as	well	 as	 the	 tailoring	 of	 solu-
tions	 already	 in	 the	 Legislative	 Guide	 to	 specifically	 address	







approach	 to	MSME	 insolvency	 that	addresses	 some	of	 the	prob-
lems	 identified	 above.	 Its	 extensive	 studies	 acknowledge	 that	
MSME	are	collectively	the	largest	employers	in	many	low-income	
countries,	 facing	 barriers	 in	 access	 to	 capital	 and	 financial	 ser-
vices.	 The	World	 Bank	 has	 developed	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 available	
instruments	to	help	meet	the	challenge	of	MSME	finance,	includ-










standard-setting	 bodies	 to	 develop	 guidelines,	 standards	 and	
good	practices.77	To	date,	there	has	not	been	the	development	of	



















At	the	highest	 level	of	generality,	 insolvency	 laws	have	four	core	
objectives:	






• Providing	 for	 the	 discharge	 of	 over-indebted	 natural	 per-
sons.	
These	 objectives	 partially	 overlap.	 For	 example,	 the	 manner	 of	
distribution	of	the	insolvency	estate	and	the	form	of	accountabil-
ity	for	timely	commencement	of	the	insolvency	process	may	each	
























entire	 value	of	 their	 claims	upon	 that	person’s	 release	 from	 fur-
ther	liabilities,	even	though	such	release	may	be	required	by	fair-
ness	 to	 that	person	and	also	be	 in	 the	broader	 social	 interest	 in	
fostering	entrepreneurial	risk-taking.		
The	Modular	Approach	 has	 several	 key	 components	 that	 enable	
pursuit	of	each	of	these	core	objectives.	It	is	designed	to	respond	
to	 the	 differences	 amongst	 economies,	 legal	 regimes,	 and	 the	
varying	types	of	business	that	comprise	MSMEs.	The	Modular	Ap-
proach	seeks	 to	generate	 incentives	 for	 relevant	parties	 to	bring	
about	 timely	 commencement	 of	 the	 insolvency	 process;	 to	 sift	
through	distressed	businesses	 to	 identify	and	 rescue	viable	ones	
and	liquidate	non-viable	ones,	to	do	so	without	making	unrealistic	
demands	 on	 parties’	 capabilities	 and	 knowledge;	 to	 respond	 to	
the	 rational	 indifference	 to	 the	 process	 of	 creditors	 and	 other	
stakeholders;	to	provide	for	the	funding	of	the	business	undergo-
ing	the	process;	to	provide	for	accountability	for	any	wrongdoing	




The	 Modular	 Approach	 recognizes	 the	 importance	 of	 enabling	








dertaken	 to	 harmonize	 SME	 and	MSME	 definitions	 at	 the	OECD	




solvency	 perspective,	 a	 globally	 uniform	 definition	may	 be	 posi-
tively	 undesirable.	 MSMEs	 require	 special	 insolvency	 treatment	








professional	 and	 court	 involvement	 against	 the	 benefits.	Where	
this	balance	 lies	would	be	highly	 likely	 to	be	 sensitive	 to	 the	at-
tributes	of	the	economy	and	legal	system.	With	that	in	mind,	the	
Modular	Approach	assumes	that	national	authorities	would	draw	
upon	 some	 combination	 of	 the	 above-described	 parameters	 to	
define	the	types	of	enterprise	that	would	be	required	or	permit-
ted	 to	make	use	of	 the	 special	 features	described	 in	 this	 report,	











This	oversight	 is	 the	administrative	 function.	 Finally,	 there	 is	 the	









suspected	or	a	 critical	party	 is	being	uncooperative.	 Instead,	 the	
judicial	function	might	be	vested	in	an	administrative	agency,	or	in	
a	regulated	insolvency	professional,	in	each	case	acting	in	a	quasi-
judicial	 capacity.	National	 legislators	would	make	 the	decision	 in	
view	 of	 their	 own	 constitutional	 arrangements,	 and	 their	 own	
assessment	of	the	relative	abilities	of	courts,	administrative	bod-
ies,	 and	private	 sector	professionals.	 Similarly,	 a	national	 legisla-
ture	may	decide	to	vest	the	management	function	in	an	adminis-












stakeholders	 to	 invoke	additional	 tools	or	 ‘modules’	 if	and	when	




process.	 In	 less	 straightforward	 cases,	 however,	 a	 requisite	 pro-
portion	 of	 stakeholders	may	 express	 their	 distrust	 in	 the	 entre-
preneur’s	competence	or	integrity	by	seeking	to	obtain	the	entre-
preneur’s	removal	and	replacement	by	an	independent	insolvency	




is	 of	 sufficient	 value	 to	 it	 to	make	 the	 costs	 of	 instructing	 legal	




with	which	 the	process	 is	 commenced.	Delayed	 commencement	
may	 result	 in	 the	destruction	of	 value	 and	perhaps	 of	 the	 going	
concern,	 as	 the	 debtor’s	 assets	 are	 seized	 by	 secured	 and	 judg-
ment	 creditors	 and/or	 misapplied	 by	 the	 debtor’s	 managers,	 in	
either	case	unimpaired	by	insolvency	moratoria.	Premature	com-
mencement,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 may	 destroy	 the	most	 realistic	
options	 for	 turning	around	 the	distressed	business	by	 ‘stigmatiz-
ing’	it	in	the	eyes	of	its	counterparties,	who	might	assume	that	it	
was	 no	 longer	 viable	 and	might	 therefore	 refuse	 to	 do	 business	
with	it	on	ordinary	commercial	terms	or	at	all.		
In	principle,	 it	 is	the	debtor’s	managers	who	have	the	best	 infor-
mation	 about	 its	 prospects	 and	 solvency,	 since	 they	 are	 dealing	
with	 counterparties	who	might	 threaten	 the	 business’s	 solvency	
by	cancelling	important	contracts	or	toughening	business	terms.	It	
is	 thus	 the	 debtor’s	 managers	 who	 are	 best	 placed	 to	 take	 the	
commencement	 decision	 in	 a	 timely	 manner.	 The	 Modular	 Ap-
proach	 creates	positive	 incentives	 for	 them	by	enabling	 them	 to	
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a	 restructuring	plan	 to	be	put	 to	 the	creditors.	The	Modular	Ap-
proach	 also	 generates	 negative	 incentives	 by	 imposing	 personal	
liability	 on	 the	 managers	 of	 corporate	 debtors	 for	 non-timely	
commencement,	 and/or	 by	 delaying	 or	 otherwise	 hardening	 the	




An	 insolvency	 framework	 should	be	designed	 to	prevent	 further	
loss	of	value	from	the	insolvency	estate.	Such	a	loss	may	occur	in	
two	 scenarios:	 (1)	 a	 viable	 business	 is	 liquidated	 in	 a	 piecemeal	
liquidation,	which	results	 in	the	 loss	of	any	remaining	going	con-
cern	 value;	 (2)	 a	 non-viable	 business	 is	 restructured	 and	 subse-
quently	 fails,	which	 results	 in	 additional	 losses	of	 the	 reinvested	
value	 that	 should	 have	 been	 invested	 in	 viable	 businesses	 in-
stead.81	In	 order	 to	prevent	 both	 types	of	 errors,	 any	 insolvency	
framework	 is	 confronted	 with	 the	 task	 of	 designing	 a	 decision-
making	procedure	that	identifies	viable	business	models	and	facil-
itates	 rescue	of	 viable	businesses	while	ensuring	 that	non-viable	
businesses	are	speedily	wound	up.	
Viability	is	determined	by	vesting	the	decision	whether	to	rehabil-
itate	or	 liquidate	the	business,	and	how	to	do	so,	 in	principle,	 in	
the	parties	who	possess	the	best	information	about	the	business,	





















private	 information	 as	 to	 the	 business’s	 viability.	 The	 Modular	
Approach	seeks	to	capitalize	on	this	private	information	by	giving	
the	debtor	and/or	its	managers	the	opportunity	of	proposing	how	
the	 insolvency	 should	 be	 addressed,	 while,	 presumptively,	 run-
ning	the	business	and	thus	retaining	the	most	current	information	
about	its	status	and	prospects.		
The	 second	 step	 in	determining	 viability	 is	 to	make	 the	ultimate	
decision	whether	 to	pursue	 rehabilitation	on	 the	basis	of	one	or	
more	proposed	plans,	or	to	consign	the	business	to	liquidation.	In	




to	 be	 honoured	 fully	 by	 the	 distressed	 enterprise.	 In	 this	 im-
portant	sense,	they	have	the	residual	claim	against	the	business,	
and	stand	to	gain	from	the	maximization	of	 its	value	and	to	 lose	
out	 if	 a	 chance	 to	maximize	 that	 value	 is	missed.	 Creditors	 as	 a	
group	thus	possess	incentives	to	pick	whichever	option	–	liquidate	
or	 rehabilitate	–	 likely	maximizes	 the	value	of	 the	business.	Cru-






















agement	 cannot	 be	 expected	 to	make	 a	 credible	 decision	 about	




ther,	 no	 other	 stakeholder	 group	 has	 legal	 rights	 at	 risk	 in	 the	
debtor’s	 insolvency:	 equity	 holders	 are	 not	 entitled	 to	 payment	
from	 the	 business	 unless	 creditors	 are	 paid	 in	 full,	 and	 neither	
management	nor	employees	are	entitled	to	maintain	their	status	
once	they	are	redundant	to	their	employer’s	requirements.	














extensive	 expertise	 in	 restructuring	 or	 liquidation.	 In	 larger	 es-
tates	 where	 significant	 value	 is	 at	 stake,	 the	 debtor	 and	 some	
stakeholders	 can	 address	 such	 deficiencies	 through	 the	 engage-
ment	of	appropriate	expertise.	However,	 such	services	are	often	
prohibitive	financially	for	MSMEs,	and	the	Modular	Approach	re-
sponds	 by	 providing	 for	 ‘off-the-shelf’	 rehabilitation	 and	 liquida-
tion	plans	requiring	minimal	customization	to	be	proposed,	by	the	
debtor	in	the	first	instance,	for	creditors’	consideration.	The	plans	
provide	both	 for	 the	deployment	of	 the	business’s	 assets	with	a	
view	to	value	maximization,	and	for	the	distribution	of	that	value	
to	 those	 entitled	 to	 it.	 The	 creation	 and	 presentation	 of	 these	
plans	 are	 discussed	 in	 Part	 VI.A.2.	 Entitlements	 are	 provided	 for	
by	law,	and	must	be	respected	unless	the	relevant	claimants	have	
agreed	to	different	treatment,	subject	always	to	requirements	 in	





The	 limited	 resources	 in	MSME	 insolvencies	 lead	 to	 very	 limited	
expectations	 for	 unsecured	 creditors	 regarding	 any	 substantial	
distribution	 in	right	of	their	claims.	Thus,	unsecured	creditors	of-
ten	have	 little	 incentive	to	 incur	 further	costs	with	regard	to	the	
insolvent	 debtor	 by	 participating	 actively	 in	 negotiations	 or	 pro-
ceedings	 (e.g.	 travel	 costs,	 communication	 costs,	 investment	 of	
time).	Overall,	 it	 is	often	rational	for	a	creditor	not	to	participate	
unless	 it	has	a	special	 interest	 in	 the	 result	of	 the	proceedings	–	
most	 notably	 because	 it	 is	 personally	 connected	 to	 the	 debtor	
(family,	 employees)	 or,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 secured	 creditors,	 to	 limit	
participation	to	the	enforcement	of	its	collateral.	The	potential	for	









of	 insolvency	and	 legal	professionals.	As	described	 in	Part	V,	 the	
Modular	Approach	dispenses	with	both	to	the	extent	practicable,	
leaving	 it	 to	the	parties	 in	the	given	case	to	seek	 involvement	of	
such	professionals	 if	the	benefits	exceed	the	costs.	As	to	funding	
the	business	undergoing	the	insolvency	process,	the	Modular	Ap-
proach	 invalidates	 counterparties’	 attempts	 to	 terminate	 both	
financial	and	trade	contracts,	so	long	as	their	interests	can	be	ad-
equately	 protected.	 In	 practice,	 this	 prohibition	means	 that	 the	







cy.	 Further,	 the	Modular	Approach	 includes	mechanisms	 to	pro-
tect	 financing	 provided	 to	 distressed	 businesses,	 differentiating	








of	 the	 insolvency	 serve	 both	 private	 and	 public	 interests.	 They	
ensure	that	the	creditors	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	given	case	
recoup	what	 they	are	owed	 to	 the	maximum	extent	practicable.	
They	also	 reinforce	commercial	morality	by	assuring	market	par-




kind	 of	 a	 thorough	 investigation	 from	 an	 outsider.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	 any	 emphasis	 on	 rescuing	 such	 a	 business	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
benefits	to	society,	to	the	debtors	and	their	family,	or	to	employ-
ees	 creates	 a	 debtor-friendly	 regime	 that	may	 incentivize	 entre-
preneurs	 to	 act	 carelessly	 or	 even	 fraudulently	 when	 causing	 a	
business	failure.	More	than	any	other	regime,	a	MSME	insolvency	
framework	 must	 therefore	 ensure	 that	 it	 provides	 an	 effective	
mechanism	 to	 detect	 fraud	 or	 other	 impropriety.	 Dishonest	 or	
reckless	entrepreneurs	do	not	deserve	to	remain	in	business	or	to	
benefit	from	a	quick	discharge,	as	discussed	below.	
The	 limited	 resources	 in	MSME	 cases	 require	 a	mechanism	 that	








mation	 and	 funding	 limitations.84		 While	 any	 public	 investigator	
and	any	 court	 investigation	would	 require	efforts	 to	detect	 such	
information,	 such	 cases	 could	 be	 properly	 handled	 by	 a	 frame-
work	 that	allows	and	 incentivizes	all	 those	who	possess	 relevant	
facts	 to	 present	 them	before	 a	 decision	 to	 rescue	 a	 business	 or	
discharge	a	debtor	is	made.	In	addition,	the	decision	to	discharge	















a	 distress	 situation,	 which	 allows	 entrepreneurs	 to	 either	 shut	
down	 or	 restructure	 their	 business	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 and,	 thus,	
reduces	the	incentive	to	take	excessive	risks	in	a	final	attempt	to	





















able	 under	 workout,	 restructuring	 and	 liquidation	 processes.	
Starting	 from	a	core	of	presumptively	essential	elements,	 it	ena-
bles	parties	to	the	given	case,	acting	with	appropriate	incentives,	





for	 a	 simple,	 clear	 cut	 default	 process	 to	 liquidate	 or	 rescue	 a	
small	business.	This	process	can	be	altered	wherever	stakeholders	
select	 specific	 modules	 to	 adapt	 the	 process	 to	 their	 specific	
needs.	Second,	the	approach	also	leaves	a	choice	of	modules	and	
their	allocation	 to	 local	 lawmakers.	Based	on	 their	cultural	back-
ground	and	political	agenda,	 legislators	may	choose	not	to	enact	
all	 of	 the	offered	modules.	 They	may	also	make	decisions	about	
the	most	 suitable	venue	 for	 liquidation	or	 rescue	proceedings	 in	
their	 jurisdictions.86	Overall,	 the	Modular	Approach	offers	a	flexi-
ble	 framework	 for	 small	 businesses	 in	 financial	 difficulties	 with	
limited	complexity	and	costs.	
The	following	images	map	the	Modular	Approach	process	by	pre-
senting	a	 visual	outline	of	 the	overall	 approach	 for	both	 liquida-









































The	 foundation	 of	 a	 rescue-oriented	 approach	 for	 viable	 busi-
nesses	 is	 a	 cost-efficient	 liquidation	 process	 for	 non-viable	 busi-
nesses.	This	procedural	option	works	as	a	 fallback	or	default	op-
tion.		
• Automatic	 liquidation:	 If	 the	 debtor	 is	 insolvent	 and	 no	
rescue	plan	is	brought	forward	by	either	the	debtor	or	any	
creditor,	or	 if	a	proposed	plan	does	not	obtain	 the	requi-
site	 approvals,	 and	 unless	 the	 appropriate	 authority	 con-
siders	that	a	modified	plan	may	obtain	approval,	the	liqui-
dation	 of	 the	 debtor’s	 business	 remains	 the	 only	 option.	
Here,	the	business	can	be	sold	on	a	going	concern	base	or	
can	be	wound	up	in	a	piecemeal	liquidation.	
• Stay	 if	 requested:	 Liquidation	 proceedings	 are	 only	 pro-
tected	by	a	short	stay	if	such	a	stay	is	requested	with	the	
motion	 to	 commence	 proceedings.	 The	 need	 for	 a	 court	
involvement	 to	 order	 a	 stay	 in	 many	 jurisdictions	 is	 a	
source	 of	 costs	 that	 seems	 unnecessary	 in	 many	 MSME	
cases	where	 a	 lack	of	 unencumbered	assets	would	 cause	













heart	 of	 such	businesses	 are	personally	 liable	 for	 the	en-
terprise’s	 obligations.	 Fraud	 and	bad	 faith	 apart,87	and	 as	
long	as	 such	debtors	 cooperate	with	 the	bankruptcy	pro-
cess	in	a	timely	manner,	there	are	both	economic	and	fair-
ness-based	 reasons	 for	affording	 them	an	early	discharge	
from	 their	 liabilities.	 Such	 discharge	 is	 a	 core	 element	 of	
the	 Modular	 Approach.	 	 Where	 the	 business	 is	 incorpo-
rated,	 but	 owned	 and	 operated	 by	 one	 individual,	 often	
the	individual	has	guaranteed	the	debt	and	is	likely	to	be-
come	personally	bankrupt	as	a	result	of	the	failure	of	the	




The	debtor,	 as	well	 as	 creditors,	may	be	entitled	 to	 initiate	pro-
ceedings	 according	 to	 the	 relevant	 test	 under	 local	 law.88	Com-
mencement	of	proceedings	presumptively	puts	the	enterprise	on	
the	route	to	liquidation.	In	the	case	of	a	conversion	of	failed	res-






going	 concern	 if	 possible	 or	 else	 piecemeal.	 Proceeds	 of	 such	 a	
sale	or	auction	would	be	used	to	(a)	cover	administrative	costs	of	















is	 simple:	 the	 order	 to	 discharge	 a	 debtor	 must	 not	 require	 a	
completed	 liquidation	of	all	 assets,	but	 should	be	available	after	
the	 debtor	 turns	 all	 of	 its	 seizable	 assets	 over	 to	 the	 liquidating	
authority.	Several	options	can	be	considered	for	handling	the	dis-
puted	claim:	
• The	most	 natural	 solution	 in	 a	 liquidation	 process	would	
be	to	sell	the	claim,	which	would	probably	mean	accepting	
a	significant	discount	on	the	nominal	value,	provided	that	
there	 is	 a	 buyer	 at	 all,	 but	would	 be	 consistent	with	 the	
idea	of	a	quick	and	low	cost	procedure.	









sponsible	 for	 litigating	and	 collecting	 the	 claim	as	well	 as	
for	 the	distribution	of	 received	payments	 to	 creditors	 (or	






tence	of	 the	 insolvency	court	 to	decide	on	such	 issues,	 the	 third	
option	would	become	the	default	solution.	
d) Discharge	of	entrepreneur		
The	Modular	 Approach	 creates	 the	 presumption	 that	 an	 honest	
and	 cooperative	 entrepreneur	 would	 be	 personally	 discharged	
from	 liabilities,	 automatically	 and	 without	 the	 need	 for	 judicial	
intervention,	 upon	 lapse	 of	 a	 stipulated	 period	 (e.g.,	 twelve	
months)	from	the	commencement	of	the	insolvency	process.	Dis-
charge	may	 be	 opposed	 by	 the	 institution	 performing	 the	man-
agement	 function.	 In	 jurisdictions	 in	 which	 such	 automatic	 dis-
charge	is	unconstitutional	or	is	considered	undesirable,	the	entre-
preneur	herself	 or	 the	 institutional	 performing	 the	management	
function	may,	 upon	 the	 lapse	 of	 the	 stipulated	 period,	 apply	 to	
the	 judicial	 authority	 for	 discharge.	 In	 either	 case,	 discharge	 oc-
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tion	 for	 liquidation	 proceedings	 is	 filed.	 This	 would	 enable	 the	
debtor	to	remain	in	possession	of	the	assets	and	to	continue	the	
business,	 propose	 and	 enforce	 a	 rescue	 plan	 that	 has	 sufficient	
creditor	support	following	a	process	that	is	cost	efficient	and	cre-

























• First,	 experience	 indicates	 that	 the	 concern	 that	 they	
would	be	displaced	from	the	helm	creates	a	powerful	dis-
incentive	 for	 debtors	 to	 commence	 the	 bankruptcy	 pro-
cess	in	a	timely	manner.		
• Second,	 the	 continuing	 presence	 of	 the	 debtor’s	 pre-
distress	decision-makers	may	be	critical	to	the	MSME’s	vi-




bankruptcy	 treatment	 is	 that	 the	 value	 at	 stake	 is	 often	





would	 propose	 a	 plan	 to	 some	 or	 all	 of	 its	 creditors.	 The	 plan’s	





for	 example,	 for	 the	 deferral	 of	 payment	 obligations,	 a	
write-down	 of	 principal	 and/or	 interest,	 debt	 for	 equity	
swaps,	 asset	 disposals	 or	 other	 downsizing	 measures,	
and/or	 provision	 for	 new	 funding,	 etc.	 Alternatively,	 the	
plan	 may	 simply	 propose	 a	 value-maximizing	 sale	 of	 the	
business,	as	a	going	concern	or	piecemeal.		
• Designing	 the	 plan:	 Based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	
debtor	 possesses	 private	 information	 about	 its	 business	
state,	 prospects,	 and	 viability,	 a	 rescue	 plan	 should	 be	
drafted	by	the	debtor	him	or	herself.	This	task	may,	how-
ever,	 overstrain	 the	 capacity	 of	many	 individuals	 running	
small	 businesses.	 The	 legal	 framework	 should,	 therefore,	
offer	advice	and	education	on	this	matter.91	Assigning	the	
task	of	plan	design	to	a	third	party	 instead	would	contra-
dict	 the	 objective	 of	 cost-efficiency,	 as	 this	 party	 would	






generate	a	plan	content	 (e.g.	classes	or	 lists)	 from	the	 in-
formation	entered	offer	a	modern	and	cost-efficient	alter-
native	that	most	MSMEs	should	be	able	to	use	as	they	typ-
ically	 have	 a	 very	 limited	 number	 of	 creditors,	 business	
partners,	employees	and	a	simple	capital	structure.		
• Classes	 of	 creditors	 and	 equity	 holders:	 Where	 creditors	
are	to	be	treated	differently,	the	plan	must	separately	ad-






same	 type	of	 claim	whom	the	plan	proposes	 to	 treat	dif-




tically	 unable	 to	 spare	 many	 resources	 to	 commence	 the	 insol-
vency	process	and	to	participate	in	it.	In	recognition	of	this	reality,	







plan)	 online	 in	 those	 economies	 in	 which	 an	 Internet-
based	process	is	a	realistic	low-cost	possibility.	Parties	par-
ticipate	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 by	 using	 standard	 forms,	 in-
cluding	a	 standard	 statement	of	affairs	and/or	a	 financial	
statement.		
• Length	 of	 the	 procedure:	 The	 institution	 discharging	 ad-

















who	 fails	 to	 vote	 within	 the	 stipulated	 period	 is	
deemed	to	have	voted	in	favour	of	the	plan	(“deemed	
approval”).	 Court	 approval	 of	 the	 plan	would	 only	 be	
required	if	the	plan	is	not	accepted	by	all	creditors	and	
shareholders	 according	 to	 their	 actual	 or	 “deemed”	
votes.		
Such	 incentivizing	measures	 respond	 to	 the	 disinterest	 of	 unse-
cured	 creditors	 in	 rescue	 proceedings	 of	MSMEs	 by	 raising	 non-
participation	costs.		





support	 because	 the	 rescue	 strategy	 relies	 on	 share-
holders’	 continued	 participation	 or	 investments.	
Shareholders	 are	 relevant	 stakeholders	 and	 should	
therefore	be	allowed	to	participate	actively	in	the	pro-
cess.	 However,	 shareholders	 are	 not	 necessarily	 enti-
tled	to	veto	a	plan	that	has	gained	creditors’	support,	
because,	for	example,	it	provides	for	a	sale	of	the	busi-
ness	 or	 a	 dilution	 of	 shares.	 Here,	 a	 cram	 down	 rule	
must	 balance	 conflicting	 creditors’	 and	 shareholders’	
interests.		
v) Fundamental	rights	
The	 position	 of	 creditors	 and	 equity	 holders	 is	 protected	 under	
fundamental	rights	relating	to	protection	of	property,	due	process	
or	 fair	 trial	 in	most	 jurisdictions.	 Such	 safeguards	need	 to	be	 re-
spected.	
• Involvement	 of	 judicial	 authority:	 The	 infringement	 of	







not	 provide	 for	 an	 appeal	 in	 MSME	 cases	 in	 order	 to	
streamline	the	process	and	limit	the	cost	burden.	For	par-
allel	 reasons,	 jurisdictions	 that	 permit	 an	 appeal	 should	
not	 automatically	 require	 suspension	 of	 the	 insolvency	
process	on	the	launch	of	an	appeal.		
• Publication	 and	 notices:	 Public	 notice	 of	 the	 commence-
ment	of	rescue	proceedings	must	be	given	through	publi-
cation,	as	appropriate,	 in	an	official	gazette,	news	media,	
the	 relevant	 online	 sources	 and	 in	 edicts	 in	 court	 hous-
es/business	 chambers,	 etc.	 In	 addition,	 the	 debtor,	 and	




position.	 Notice	 given	 through	 reasonably	 cost-effective	
methods,	 including	 publicly	 and	 (where	 appropriate)	 to	
the	 last	 reasonably	 known	 address	 of	 a	 stakeholder,	




The	 debtor,	 in	 principle,	 possesses	 private	 information	 about	 its	
business	 state,	 prospects	 and	 viability.	 The	 Modular	 Approach	
seeks	to	create	positive	and	negative	incentives	for	the	debtor	to	
capitalize	 on	 this	 information	 to	make	 a	 timely	 commencement	




option	 is	 to	 require	 that	 the	motion	of	 the	debtor	must	be	 sup-









and/or	 perverse	 incentives,	 may	 not	 commence	 the	 bankruptcy	
process	 in	 a	 timely	 manner.	 The	 possibility	 of	 creditor	 com-




































as	 a	 precondition	 to	 making	 use	 of	 the	 insolvency	 process	 can	
inflict	 reputational	 harm	 on	 the	 debtor	 and/or	 its	 business,	 and	
may	thus	retard	the	prospects	of	its	rehabilitation	and	create	dis-
incentives	for	the	debtor	to	commence	the	process.	The	rationale	
for	 requiring	 a	declaration	of	 insolvency	 is	 to	minimize	 abuse	of	








examine	whether	 the	plan	 complies	with	 the	 legal	 requirements	
regarding	plan	 content	and	plan	proceedings,	 especially	with	 re-
spect	to	plan	acceptance	and	cram	down.	
• Accepting	 a	 plan:	 The	 plan	 would	 be	 approved	 upon	
receiving	 actual	 or	 deemed	 consent	 by	 all	 affected	
creditor	and	equity	classes.	






o Where	 an	 opposing	 stakeholder	 is	 part	 of	 a	
class	 that	 supports	 the	 plan	 by	 a	 majority	 of	





uidation	 (“no	 creditor	 worse	 off”	 principle	 or	
“best	interest	test”).	In	a	small	business	case,	a	
judge	should	be	able	to	determine	the	outcome	





considered	 that	 would	 allow	 the	 confirmation	














subject	 to	 review	 under	 local	 procedural	 law,	
but	any	appeal	 should	not	 stay	 the	 implemen-
tation	of	the	plan.	
d) Implementation	and	amendment	
The	 implementation	of	 the	plan	basically	means	 that	 the	debtor	















































































The	 creditor-friendly	modules	 recognize	 the	 reality	 that	 the	 role	
of	 creditors	 is	 critical.	 Apart	 from	 the	 debtor	 itself,	 its	 creditors	
possess	 the	 best	 information	 about	 its	 business	 and	 prospects.	
























ness,	 and	 thus	 stand	 to	 gain	 or	 lose	 in	 line	with	 the	 fortunes	of	
that	business.	As	a	group,	they	therefore	also	have	the	best	incen-
tives	 to	 get	 the	 liquidate/restructure	 decision	 right.	 Finally,	 and	
importantly,	creditors	have	legal	claims	that	the	distressed	debtor	
is	 presumptively	 unable	 to	 satisfy.	 In	 recognition	 of	 these	 facts,	








use.	 Resources	 permitting,	 a	 stipulated	 proportion	 (e.g.,	 20%	 by	
value)	of	creditors95	may	seek	mediation	concerning	the	admissi-
bility	or	quantum	of	claims,	 the	 formulation	of	a	plan,	 the	 treat-
ment	 of	 guarantees,	 or	 any	 other	 issue	 in	 dispute	 between	 the	
parties.	 In	 general,	 the	 failure	of	mediation	 should	not	 have	 ad-
verse	 consequences	 to	 any	 party,	 so	 as	 not	 to	 discourage	 their	
participation	in	the	process	in	the	first	place.		
A	mediation	motion	would	be	 available	 anytime	during	 the	pro-







do	 so	 quickly,	 a	mediator	 should	 be	 appointed,	 preferably	 by	 a	















have	 credentialing	agencies.	 The	mediator	 should	be	 involved	 in	
decisions	 regarding	 timing	 and	 information	 dissemination	 from	




The	creditor	plan	proposal	module	 simply	 is	 the	 right	of	 a	 single	
creditor,	or	a	stipulated	majority	of	creditors,	 to	propose	a	com-
peting	plan.	Any	creditor	dissatisfied	by	the	credibility	or	viability	
of	 a	 debtor-proposed	 plan	may	 put	 forward	 its	 own	 alternative	
using	 the	 same	 forms	 and	 format.	 An	 important	 scenario	would	






The	 debtor	 action	 moratorium	 module	 affects	 the	 right	 of	 the	






incentivize	 creditors	 to	 commence	 bankruptcy	 as	 a	way	 of	 disa-
bling	 the	debtor’s	ability	 to	diminish	or	misapply	 the	value	 in	 its	
own	 estate.	 The	 effect	 of	 the	 module	 may,	 however,	 interfere	
with	the	debtor’s	ability	to	continue	the	business.	It	must	be	han-
dled	with	care.	
An	example	of	 attempting	 to	maintain	 the	balance	between	 the	
debtor’s	 ability	 to	 carry	 on	 the	 business	 and	 preventing	 undue	
diminishment	or	misapplication	of	value	can	be	found	in	Canadian	













penses	 incurred	 in	 carrying	 on	 business	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course,	
payments	 required	 by	 law	 such	 as	 employment	 insurance	 and	
income	 taxes,	 but	 preclude	 payments	 to	 pre-filing	 creditors	 ex-
cept	 in	 limited	 circumstances	 and	 also	 preclude	 any	 further	 en-
cumbering	of	 assets.	 They	prevent	 the	debtor	 from	disposing	of	
assets	of	 a	 value	above	a	 cap	 tailored	 to	 the	 specific	 day-to-day	
requirements	of	the	business.		
ii) Motion	
Given	 the	possible	 indirect	 costs	of	a	debtor	action	moratorium,	




be	 granted	 automatically	 for	 a	 short	 specified	 period,	 with	 the	
ability	 of	 other	 creditors	 or	 the	 debtor	 to	 demonstrate	 to	 the	
competent	authority	that	its	imposition	was	unnecessary.	
iii) Decision	
Where	 the	 threshold	 proportion	 of	 claims	 is	 not	 reached	 or	 the	
other	creditors	or	debtor	objects,	the	competent	authority	would	
only	order	a	debtor	action	moratorium	or	 its	continuation	 if	 it	 is	
necessary	to	protect	the	interest	of	creditors	from	specific	debtor	
action,	 such	as	disposing	of	 assets	under	 value	or	 signing	a	 con-




The	 insolvency	 practitioner	 involvement	 module	 (“IP	 module”)	
allows	 creditors	 to	 not	 only	 veto	 specific	 debtor	 actions	 but	 to	
displace	the	debtor’s	pre-distress	decision	makers	(thus	overturn-
ing	the	debtor-in-possession	default).	It	can	also	be	used	to	over-
see	 and	 thus	 give	 credibility	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 an	 ap-
proved	plan	(supervised	debtor-in-possession).		
Where	 the	 IP	works	as	a	 trustee,	 the	debtor’s	 right	 to	 remain	 in	
possession	of	 the	assets	and	to	run	the	business	ends.	Here,	 the	









goes	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 a	 debtor	 action	 moratorium.	 The	 in-
volvement	of	an	IP	is	common	in	many	jurisdictions,	either	instead	





the	 process	 by	 any	 creditor	 with	 a	 claim	 above	 a	 significant	






fied	 value	 (e.g.,	 20%)	 indicate	 their	 desire	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 debtor	




The	 doomed-to-failure	module	 is	 the	most	 intrusive	module	 be-
cause	 it	 terminates	debtor-initiated	 rescue	proceedings.	 The	use	
of	 the	module	must,	 therefore,	be	reserved	 for	cases	where	any	
continuation	 of	 rescue	 efforts	 is	 an	 obvious	 waste	 of	 time	 and	
assets	 or	 an	 obvious	misuse	 of	 procedural	 options.	 The	module	
























mediation	 module	 described	 above.	 The	 issue	 with	 debtor-
initiated	mediation	is	that	a	party	seeking	to	delay	the	bankruptcy	
process	 improperly	 –	 characteristically,	 the	 debtor	 –	 may	 have	






stay.	 Such	 a	 creditor	 action	moratorium	would	 only	 be	 available	
on	 request.97	The	creditor	action	moratorium	would	affect	 credi-
tor	 claim	 enforcement	 as	 well	 as	 ipso	 facto	 clauses	 and	 set-off	
rights.	 It	 is	 a	 critical	 bankruptcy	 tool	 that	 signals	 the	 transition	
from	 the	 individual	 non-bankruptcy	 to	 the	 collective	 bankruptcy	
process,	 and	 creates	 a	 space	 in	which	 rational	 decisions	may	be	
made	about	maximization	of	the	value	of	the	debtor’s	estate	and	
about	 its	 fair	 distribution.	 In	 systems	 with	 an	 effective	 non-
bankruptcy	creditor	claim	enforcement	regime,	the	availability	of	
this	moratorium	 creates	 incentives	 for	 the	 debtor	 to	 commence	
the	 bankruptcy	 process	 in	 response	 to	 initial	 creditor	 pressure,	




spects,	 the	 impairment	of	 the	debtor’s	 relationships	with	 stayed	
creditors,	and	also	the	potential	for	debtor	abuse	and	thus	of	val-
ue	destruction.	The	Modular	Approach	treats	 the	moratorium	as	














request	 –	 done	 simply	 by	 checking	 the	 box	 on	 the	motion	 tem-
plate	with	the	request	of	a	stay.	Still,	a	non-automatic	stay	leaves	











The	 efficiency	 of	 any	 liquidation	 or	 rescue	 procedure	 under	 the	
Modular	Approach	depends	on	the	people	assigned	to	run	it.	The	
institutional	 framework	 is	 essential	 and	must	 consider	 two	basic	
principles:		
• Low	 cost	 approach:	MSME	 insolvencies	 are	 characterised	
by	a	lack	of	assets;	no	asset	cases	are	a	regular	phenome-
non.	 Any	 involvement	 of	 additional	 institutions	 must,	

























party.	 Often,	 such	 a	 function	 would	 require	 the	 involve-
ment	of	a	judge.	
1. Levels	of	institutional	tasks	
Based	on	 these	principles,	 three	 tasks	or	 functions	are	 to	be	as-
signed	to	institutions	under	the	Modular	Approach.	
a) Management	functions	
The	 first	 and	basic	 level	 is	 characterized	by	 those	measures	 that	
are	 required	 to	manage	 the	debtor’s	business	 through	 the	 insol-
vency	 and	 rescue	 process	 or	 to	 manage	 the	 liquidation	 of	 the	
debtor’s	 business.	 Such	management	 functions	 include	 ordinary	
commercial	 decisions	 but	 also	 commercially	 informed	 choices	
about	which	of	 the	 available	 legal	 tools	 to	deploy.	 It	would	 also	
comprise	 the	 task	 of	 negotiating	 with	 creditors,	 other	 investors	
and	stakeholders	(e.g.	shareholders,	employees,	government	offi-
cials	 like	 tax	 authorities)	 to	 obtain	 a	 desirable	 conclusion	 to	 the	
insolvency	process.		
b) Administrative	functions	
Insolvency	proceedings	are	a	 legal	procedure	 that	 requires	over-
sight	 to	 ensure	 that	motions	 are	 being	 taken	 care	 of,	 deadlines	
and	formalities	are	being	met,	notifications	are	duly	provided,	and	




Finally,	 there	 is	the	 judicial	 function	of	ensuring	that	the	 law	has	
been	 correctly	 applied,	 reasonable	 findings	 of	 fact	 have	 been	
reached,	and	the	parties	have	all	been	treated	fairly.	
The	 Modular	 Approach	 originates	 from	 existing	 insolvency	 pro-
ceedings	 and	 it	 seems	 an	 obvious	 choice,	 therefore,	 to	 opt	 for	
court	proceedings.	For	MSMEs,	such	a	design	is	debatable.	Courts	
are	 a	 precious	 and	 scarce	 resource.	 Judicial	 processes	 can	 be	
lengthy,	and	recourse	to	them	also	characteristically	requires	the	
involvement	 of	 sometimes	 expensive	 legal	 professionals.	 Given	








process	 leads	 to	 an	 infringement	 of	 a	 stakeholder’s	 legal	 right	
without	their	consent,	access	to	judicial	review	is	guaranteed.		
Following	 the	 “scream	 or	 die”	 principle,	 this	 approval	 does	 not	
require	 a	 judge	 to	 be	 present	 and	 to	 supervise	 proceedings	 nor	
does	it	indeed	seem	appropriate	to	impose	a	mandatory	sanction-







under	 a	majority	 rule	 or	 cram-down	 rule	without	 court	 involve-
ment	whenever	 the	 rejecting	 creditor	 (possibly	 after	 recognizing	
the	extend	of	support	by	other	creditors)	does	not	file	a	motion	to	













Further,	 the	debtor	or	even	a	 secured	creditor	 could	also	be	as-
signed	with	some	of	these	functions.		
a) Liquidation	proceedings	
Selling	 the	 debtor’s	 assets	 in	 a	 quick	 liquidation	 should	 not	 be	
entrusted	 to	 the	 debtor	 at	 the	 management	 level	 because	 the	









agreement	 or	 statutory	 right),	 non-insolvency	 law	 would	 allow	
such	a	creditor	to	enforce	 its	rights.	 In	such	a	case,	there	 is	 little	
need	to	involve	another	institution	at	the	management	level.	
The	secured	lender	solution,	however,	is	not	sufficient	where	such	
a	 secured	 creditor	 is	 either	non-existent	or	not	willing	 to	act,	or	
where	there	are	other	assets	not	subject	to	security	or	subject	to	
the	security	 rights	of	different	creditors.	 In	 such	cases,	 the	man-
agement	task	could	be	assigned	to	an	IP	or	a	public	authority	(e.g.	
a	 specialized	 government	 agency	 or	 a	 court	 registrar)	 or	 self-
regulatory	 organization	 (e.g.	 a	 professional	 insolvency	 associa-
tion).	Preferably,	a	specialist	 (probably	an	 IP)	should	act	 in	these	
cases.	
If	 a	major	 secured	 creditor	 or	 an	 IP	 appointed	 by	 such	 creditor	
acts	at	 the	management	 level,	 supervision	would	only	be	neces-
sary	 where	 a	 stakeholder	 is	 unhappy	 with	 the	 way	 the	 auction	
process	or	any	other	type	of	liquidation	action	is	being	conducted	
by	 the	 secured	 lender	who	may	only	be	 interested	 in	 realizing	a	
sale	 that	 covers	 its	 outstanding	 debt	 but	 not	 the	 best	 price	
achievable.	 A	 motion	 for	 supervision	 would	 be	 directed	 to	 and	



















Insolvency	 practitioners	 play	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 most	 insolvency	
systems.	With	 perhaps	 the	 conspicuous	 exception	 of	 the	United	
States,101	the	 appointment	 of	 technically	 qualified,	 independent	




the	 size	 of	 the	 debtor;	 and	 yet,	 the	 smaller	 cases	 present	 some	
peculiarities	that	would	merit	a	closer	look:	
• On	the	face	of	it,	the	tasks	to	be	performed	by	insolvency	
practitioners	 in	MSME	 cases	 will	 be	 simpler	 –albeit	 rela-
tively	 no	 less	 important-	 than	 in	 the	 larger	 insolvencies.	
The	liquidation	of	a	small	estate	will	involve	the	reception,	
analysis,	treatment	and	provision	of	information	to	a	nor-
mally	 smaller	 crowd	 of	 creditors	 through	 the	 use	 of	 pre-
defined	 templates	 or	 the	 technical	 opinion	 on	 a	 non-
complex	 business	 plan.	 Yet,	 the	 IP´s	 tasks	 will	 often	 be	




ers	 and	 directors	 take	 proud,	 non-collaborative	 positions	
all	 through	 the	 process.	 As	 a	 result,	 but	 also	 in	 general,	
mediation	gains	 importance	amongst	the	tasks	to	be	per-
formed	by	the	 insolvency	practitioners	 in	the	smaller	cas-
es.	 Mediation	 in	 its	 most	 strict	 sense	 (relationship	 be-



















ought	 to	 be	 linked	 with	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 case,	 the	
value	of	assets,	and	should	provide	for	the	increase	of	the	
fee	based	on	successful	events	(approval	of	a	plan,	sale	as	
a	 going	 concern,	 etc.).	 In	many	 jurisdictions,	 a	minimum	
fixed	amount	for	the	insolvency	practitioners	is	also	set	by	
regulation/law.		
• The	 professionalization	 of	 IPs	 active	 in	MSME	 insolvency	
may	be	highly	complicated:	less	economic	gains	can	be	ex-
pected,	no	less	complexity	in	the	personal	relationships	in-
volved	 in	 the	 case,	 and	 often	 straightforward,	 repetitive	
work	from	a	technical	standpoint.	Combined	with	the	nec-
essary	 limitation	 of	 fees,	 these	 factors	 hamper	 the	 crea-
tion	of	a	body	of	professionals	sufficient	in	number	to	ca-
ter	for	the	entire	market.	The	professionalization	must	be	






tem	of	 professional	 IPs	 is	 not	 possible	or	would	 take	 too	
much	 time/cost,	 public	 agencies	 might	 fill	 the	 gap	 in	 a	
number	 of	 ways:	 either	 by	 strengthening	 the	 profession	
via	control	of	access	requirements	and	implementation	of	
correct	 professional	 standards;	 or	 by	providing	 a	 body	of	
public	 –or	 publicly	 trained,	 selected	 and	 funded-
professionals.	Whatever	 the	model	 chosen,	 IPs	 in	 charge	
of	MSME	insolvencies	must	complement	the	general	tech-
nical	 skills	 demanded	 from	 the	 profession	 with	 special	
knowledge	of	mediation,	family	law	and	other	directly	ap-
plicable	disciplines	directly	 related	 to	 the	 issues	 that	may	
arise	 in	these	types	of	cases.	 In	countries	with	an	already	
created,	 robust-enough	profession,	 the	professional	body	
could	 separate	 its	 constituents	 depending	on	 the	 type	of	
cases	 they	 specialize	 and	 are	 licensed	 to	 practice	 in.	 The	
access	 requirements,	 system	 of	 fees,	 code	 of	 conduct,	








• In	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 systems,	 insolvency	 practitioners	
are	appointed	either	by	the	judge/insolvency	agency	or	by	
creditors.	 There	 are	 pros	 and	 cons	 for	 both	 systems,	 but	
the	direct	selection	by	creditors	in	MSMEs	gives	rise	to	ad-
ditional	 problems	 due	 to	 the	 common	 passivity	 of	 unse-
cured	 creditors	 in	 the	 smaller	 cases.	 An	 appointment	 by	
the	judge	or	an	insolvency	agency	(or,	as	in	some	jurisdic-
tions,	by	notaries	or	registrars)	 is	the	most	common	solu-
tion.	 Even	 if	 the	 decision-maker	 is	 a	 judge	 or	 a	 public	
agency,	the	selection	of	candidates	must	be	based	on	their	
technical	 abilities	 and	 their	 special	 suitability	 to	 a	 given	
case	 (for	example,	because	of	previous	experience	 in	 the	
sector	of	the	debtor´s	activity).	However,	in	smaller	cases,	
a	 system	 that	provides	 for	 the	automatic	 selection	based	
on	 turns	 is	more	 acceptable,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 list	 of	 candi-
dates	only	 includes	 candidates	 generally	 qualified	 for	 the	
job.		
Overall,	 however,	 the	 involvement	 of	 insolvency	 professionals	
may	 not	 add	 net	 value	 in	 some	 cases.	 Experience	 from	 systems	
that	 severely	 constrain	 the	 remuneration	 of	 insolvency	 profes-
sionals103	indicates	that	the	IP’s	involvement	is	in	practice	nominal	
only,	 the	 debtor	 does	 not	 receive	 the	 benefit	 of	 genuine	 inde-
pendent	expertise,	and	the	creditors	do	not	receive	the	benefit	of	
genuine	independent	oversight	of	the	debtor.	By	contrast,	in	sys-
tems	where	 the	 IP	 has	 greater	 control	 over	 their	 remuneration,	
even	 when	 subject	 to	 challenge	 by	 a	 dispersed	 and	 ‘apathetic’	
creditor	 group,	104	perverse	 incentives	 arise	 for	 the	 IP	 to	 inflate	
fees,	engage	 in	value-destructive	collusion	with	 repeat-player	 in-
stitutional	 lenders	 (and	 sometimes	 with	 the	 debtor	 itself),	 and	
shirk	 on	 the	 primary	 responsibility	 to	 find	 the	 value-maximizing	
solution	to	the	insolvency.	Either	the	design	of	a	proper	system	of	
remuneration	 (that	 neither	 pays	 too	 little	 nor	 creates	 perverse	
incentives),	or	 the	 involvement	of	 a	public	 authority	would	miti-
gate	such	incentives.		
In	MSME	insolvency,	the	appointment	of	a	committee	of	creditors	
is	 uncommon,	 which	 leaves	 insolvency	 representatives	 without	
direct	control	by	a	body	of	creditors.	Monitoring	insolvency	repre-








for	 control	 mechanisms.	 Insolvency	 practitioners	 may	 be	 con-
trolled	by	a	public	agency	or	the	self-regulatory	organization	(or,	







This	 situation	 is	 very	 common	 in	 developing	 economies	 and	 in	
jurisdictions	 where	 there	 is	 a	 weak	 insolvency	 culture	 (i.e.,	 the	
insolvency	 carries	 a	 strong	 stigma	and/or	 the	 system	 is	 not	 per-
ceived	 as	 a	 proper	 instrument	 to	 handle	 business	 financial	 dis-
tress):	 insolvency	is	declared	too	late,	when	there	are	hardly	any	
assets	 left.	 This	 scenario	 is	 even	more	 common	 in	MSME	 cases.	
The	problem	can	be	tackled	by	the	direct	intervention	of	a	public	
agency.	The	agency	would	provide	the	specialists	that	take	charge	






tion	 can	 also	 be	 solved	 by	 resorting	 to	market	mechanisms.	 For	
example,	 IPs	appointed	for	these	cases	would	be	guaranteed	the	
payment	 of	 a	 minimum	 amount	 out	 of	 a	 fund	 nurtured	 with	 a	
percentage	withheld	 from	the	 fees	of	ordinary	cases	or	with	 the	
fees	of	entry	to	the	professional	body.	This	form	of	mutualization	
could	 be	 appeased	 by	 the	 introduction	 of	 other	 sources	 to	 the	
fund:	a	percentage	of	 the	 fees	paid	to	the	register	of	companies	
for	 the	use	of	 the	registry	or	a	percentage	of	 the	money	paid	to	




Finally,	 a	 third	 alternative	might	 also	 be	 considered.	 In	 jurisdic-









insufficient	 level	of	 formality,	consideration	 is	being	given	to	 the	
creation	of	a	strong	mixed	private/public	agency	(hosted,	though,	
by	a	Ministry)	that	plays	the	following	roles:		
• The	 agency	 receives	 notifications	 by	 the	 debtor/related	
parties	 (managers,	 partners	with	 a	 certain	 percentage	 of	
the	 capital),	 all	 public	 administrations	 (tax/social	 securi-
ty/registrars/etc.)	 and	 professional	 lenders	 of	 a	 debtor´s	
early	situation	of	distress	(for	example,	when	a	debtor	de-
posits	 accounts	 at	 the	 registrar	 with	 losses	 that	 account	
for	¾	of	the	share	capital);		






would	aim	to	solve	the	problems	of	 late	 filings,	of	 lack	of	
information	 and	 lack	 of	 technical	 independent	 advice	 to	













for	online	 templates	 for	plan	proposals,	 information	on	 the	pro-
cedure	 and	 available	 advisors.	 Such	 an	 institution	 could	 also	 be	
entrusted	 with	 verifying	 the	 completeness	 of	 the	 information	
supplied,	 following	 up	 where	 necessary	 to	 obtain	 further	 input,	










ronment	 in	 a	 jurisdiction,	 an	 independent	 private	 organization	
(e.g.	 a	 part	 of	 a	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce).	 Three	 considerations	
combine	to	motivate	the	default	choice	of	a	government	entity	to	
discharge	this	function.		














taking	 responsibility	 for	 overseeing	 the	 process.	 In	 such	
cases,	 a	 not-for-profit	 process	 may	 maximise	 returns	 to	
stakeholders	as	a	group.	
These	 considerations	 suggest	 that,	 as	 a	 default,	 a	 government	
entity	 may	 be	 best	 placed	 to	 oversee	 the	 process.	 This	 agency	
may	be	funded,	explicitly	or	through	an	implicit	premium	in	busi-
ness	 taxes	 or	 rates,	 by	 a	 levy	 on	 all	 or	 a	 subset	 of	 solvent	 busi-
nesses.	This	approach	would	also	more	effectively	cause	business	
to	internalize	the	costs	imposed	by	them	on	society.	









tion	 challenges	 that	 insolvency	 systems	may	 face	when	applying	
the	 Modular	 Approach,	 particularly	 its	 usage	 by	 the	 different	
stakeholders	involved.	Problems	may	arise	with	regard	to	the	ob-
ligations	of	the	debtor	subject	of	the	MSME	regime;	the	 involve-
ment	of	 the	 creditors	 in	 the	process;	 the	position	of	 connected-




vency	 system	 and	 proposes	 certain	 solutions	 to	 address	 these	
barriers.	 Solutions	 may	 require	 tailoring	 to	 the	 specific	 circum-
stances	of	different	legal	systems,	and	therefore,	in	relevant	plac-





















The	 absence	 of	 a	 rescue	 culture	 and	 the	 aforementioned	 social	




by	 the	 incentives	 discussed	 above.	 Yet,	 experience	 shows	 that	
incentives	are	often	not	enough.	More	drastic	measures	have	 to	
be	 implemented	 in	 the	 form	of	 sanctions	 and	 compensation	 for	
damages	when	certain	circumstances	accrue.	In	this	section,	these	
sanctions	 are	 analyzed	 in	 some	 detail,	 with	 particular	 regard	 to	
wrongful	 trading/duty	 to	 file	 rules,	which	 serve	 the	 double	 pur-
pose	of	ensuring	an	early	filing	of	insolvency	and	protecting	credi-





may	 nonetheless	 arise	 concerning	 the	manner	 in	which	 debtors	
utilize	the	MSME	insolvency	regime.	If	not	properly	designed	and	
implemented,	 the	 specifically	 MSME-tailored	 insolvency	 system	
may	 be	 prone	 to	 misuse	 and/or	 abuse,	 particularly	 where	 a	
Modular	 Approach	 is	 implemented	 that	 allows	 for	 a	 significant	
degree	of	choice	and	flexibility.	Thus,	insolvent	debtors	may	have	
the	incentive	to	opt	for	“modules”	that	protect	their	own	interest	
to	 the	detriment	of	 creditors	or	 the	 long-term	health	of	 the	en-
terprise.	 Further,	 in	 the	 realm	 of	MSMEs,	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 in-
formation	on	the	debtor´s	affairs	and	financial	situation	and	a	low	
level	of	interest	by	creditors	may	pave	the	way	for	debtor	misbe-
haviour.	 This	 section	considers	ways	 to	 tackle	debtor	moral	haz-





but	 is	not	necessarily	 already	 in	a	 state	of	 actual	 insolvency	and	
has	 not	 yet	 entered	 formal	 insolvency	 proceedings	 of	 any	 sort.	
Addressing	irresponsible	behaviour	by	debtors	and	misuse	of	the	













the	 business’	 assets.	 They	 may	 be	 inclined	 to	 collaborate	 with	
related	persons	or	powerful	 creditors,	 hide	or	dispose	of	 assets.	
The	 problem	 is	 particularly	 acute	where	 debtors	 use	 the	 corpo-




about	 returning	 to	 the	managerial	 labour	market	and	 thus	more	
prone	 to	act	 self-servingly.	Unincorporated	MSMEs	may	 take	ex-
cessive	risks	if	they	consider	that	they	will	be	released	from	liabili-
ties	through	an	insolvency	discharge.	
A	 regime	 that	 focuses	 on	 the	 period	 of	 imminent	 insolvency	 is	
particularly	important	for	encouraging	action	at	an	early	stage	and	
for	facilitating	rescues	of	viable	businesses,	aspects	that	are	criti-
cal	 to	 the	 procedural	 framework	 contemplated	 for	MSME	 insol-
vencies.	 Therefore,	 a	 regime	 for	 pre-insolvency	 obligations	 can	
complement	 the	 procedural	 framework	 and	 enhance	 it.	 It	 can	
provide	an	educational	tool	for	MSMEs	with	regard	to	the	proper	
means	 for	 addressing	 the	 situation	 of	 financial	 distress	 and	 the	
proper	use	of	the	module	options.		
A	 regime	 that	 addresses	 the	 obligations	 of	 debtors	 at	 times	 ap-
proaching	 insolvency	 can	 respond	 to	 such	 concerns	 as	 debtor	
moral	hazard.	 It	can	deter	 irresponsible	behaviour	at	 times	of	 fi-
nancial	 distress	 and	 provide	 guidance	 to	 debtors	with	 regard	 to	
the	appropriate	actions	they	should	take.	
a) A	balanced	regime		
The	 regime	 for	MSME	debtors’	 obligations	 at	 times	 approaching	
insolvency	should	carefully	balance	the	need	to	protect	creditors	
from	 debtors’	 mismanagement	 and	 irresponsible	 behaviour	 on	
the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 need	 to	 incentivize	 entrepreneurship	 as	
well	as	the	rescue	of	distressed	businesses,	on	the	other.	An	over-
ly	 draconian	 regime	 of	 pre-insolvency	 obligations	would	 run	 the	
risk	that	debtors	will	be	deterred	from	running	businesses;	debt-




















or	obligations	 should	also	match	 the	procedural	 framework	pro-
posed	for	MSME	insolvency.	Thus,	it	should	provide	protection	to	
debtors	 from	 any	 personal	 liability	 in	 circumstances	where	 they	
attempted	in	good	faith	any	of	procedures	in	the	module,	includ-
ing	 informal	 negotiations.	 The	 regime	 should	 also	 complement	
and	 be	 supported	 by	 an	 adequate	 institutional	 framework,	 and	
debtors	should	be	incentivised	to	take	full	advantage	of	the	insti-
tutional	 framework	 that	 the	 system	 provides	 for	MSMEs	 in	 dis-
tress.		
b) A	regime	based	on	“wrongful	trading”		
Many	 insolvency	 systems	 recognize	 that	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 man-
agement	obligations	 regime	shifts	 to	prioritizing	value	maximiza-
tion	 and	 preservation	 of	 the	 estate,	 primarily	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	
the	creditors	as	a	whole,	once	insolvency	proceedings	commence.	
However,	 there	 is	 greater	 diversity	 regarding	 the	 governance	 of	
debtors	when	the	debtor	experiences	financial	distress	but	is	not	
yet	in	insolvency	proceedings.106		
Some	 regimes	 impose	 a	 duty	on	managers	 to	 initiate	 insolvency	
proceedings	within	a	 short	period	after	 the	occurrence	of	 an	 in-
solvency	event.107	Other	systems	adopt	“wrongful	trading”	provi-
sions	 that	 essentially	 impose	a	duty	on	directors	 to	 give	due	 re-
gard	to	the	interests	of	creditors	when	they	realize	that	insolvent	















2013)	 and	 recent	 amendments	 of	 the	World	 Bank	 Principles	 on	




negotiations	or	 reorganization	and	 to	 stop	directors	 from	




ing	 that	 legal	 regimes	may	 impose	 additional	measures	 to	deter	
misconduct.	 It	 favours	 flexibility	 and	 deference	 to	 directors’	
judgment	 over	 the	 more	 restrictive	 approaches.	 It	 aims	 to	 en-
courage	 directors	 to	 consider	 rescue	 possibilities	 in	 times	 of	 fi-
nancial	 crisis,	 while	 providing	 a	 regime	 that	 mitigates	 directors’	
concerns	about	the	risks	that	accompany	attempts	to	rescue	the	
business.	 It	 further	 states	 that	 provisions	 addressing	 the	 obliga-
tion	of	directors	and	remedies	for	breach	of	duties	should	be	im-
plemented	 in	a	way	that	does	not	adversely	affect	successful	 re-
organization,	 does	 not	 discourage	 participation	 in	 the	 manage-
ment	of	companies,	and	does	not	prevent	the	exercise	of	reason-
able	 business	 judgment	 or	 the	 taking	 of	 reasonable	 commercial	
risk.	At	the	same	time,	the	standard	acknowledges	that	creditors	
may	be	at	 risk	 in	 the	period	 leading	up	 to	 insolvency	and	 there-
fore	that	directors	must	consider	creditors’	interests	when	making	
decisions	during	this	time.112	
The	 insolvency	standard	 thus	 recommends	 that	when	 insolvency	
is	 imminent	or	unavoidable,	 the	 legitimate	 interests	of	creditors,	
as	well	 as	 those	of	 other	 stakeholders,	 should	be	protected	and	
that	appropriate	remedies	for	breach	of	duties	to	consider	these	
interests	should	be	provided.	Specifically,	it	is	recommended	that	










the	 initiation	 of	 formal	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 However,	 the	
standard	does	not	suggest	that	directors	should	be	obliged	to	file	
for	 insolvency	within	a	 specific	period	of	 time.	 Furthermore,	 the	
time	at	which	the	obligations	arise	is	not	defined	in	precise	terms.	
Rather,	 it	 generally	 corresponds	 to	 a	 state	 of	 factual	 insolvency,	
actual	 or	 imminent,	 before	 insolvency	 proceedings	 have	 begun.	
The	 obligation	 to	 take	 steps	 to	 avoid	 insolvency	 or	minimize	 its	
effect	 arises	 when	 directors,	 defined	 broadly,114	knew	 or	 ought	
reasonably	to	have	known	that	 insolvency	was	 imminent	or	una-




Where	 creditors	 have	 suffered	 loss	 or	 damage	 because	 of	 a	
breach	of	the	obligations,	the	person	owing	the	obligation	may	be	
liable	 subject	 to	 possible	 defences,	 including	 that	 the	 director	
took	 reasonable	 steps	 to	 avoid	 or	minimize	 the	 extent	 of	 insol-
vency.	 Liability	 should	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	





context.	 It	will	 ensure	 consistency	 and	 compliance	with	 interna-
tional	 standards	 that	 apply	 to	business	 entities.	 Furthermore,	 as	
noted	 above,	 an	 effective	 regime	 for	 MSMEs	 should	 be	 largely	
based	 on	 quick	 actions	 taken	 by	 debtors.	 A	 debtor	 obligations	
regime	 that	 similarly	 incentivizes	 early	 action	 and	 rescue,	 even	
before	 the	debtor	 is	 in	 actual	 insolvency,	 is	 therefore	most	 ade-














their	 general	 obligations	 at	 times	 of	 financial	 distress	 and	 may	
also	 drive	 debtors	 to	 commence	 insolvency	 proceedings	 prema-
turely.		
Legal	 systems	 that	adopt	 this	 type	of	debtor	obligations	 (akin	 to	








The	 insolvency	standard	 regarding	directors’	obligations	at	 times	
approaching	 insolvency,	 although	 generally	 appropriate	 for	
MSMEs,	may	be	modified	to	better	reflect	MSMEs’	circumstances.	
The	 standard	 has	 been	 designed	 for	 companies	 and	 their	 direc-
tors,	while	MSMEs	may	operate	as	unincorporated	entities.	Gen-
erally,	 the	 standard	 provides	 a	 relatively	 sophisticated	 regime,	
and	 therefore	 may	 require	 simplification	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 re-
gime	is	not	too	cumbersome	for	MSMEs;	that	it	is	clear;	and	that	
it	 does	 not	 require	 seeking	 sophisticated	 and	 expensive	 profes-
sional	advice.		
Additionally,	although	the	 insolvency	standard	 is	balanced	and	 is	
primarily	focused	on	civil	 liability	for	(limited)	compensation,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 regime	 does	 not	 deter	 starting	 up	
small	 businesses	 or	 addressing	 MSMEs’	 financial	 distress.	 Small	
debtors	should	not	be	overly	concerned	about	the	consequences	
of	failure.	Thus,	the	regime	may	require	some	relaxation	in	terms	
of	 the	expectations	 from	small	debtors,	at	 times	approaching	 in-





The	 delineations	 of	 the	 obligation	 and	 the	 steps	 to	 discharge	 it	
should	be	 simplified,	 removing	 such	steps	 that	may	be	 less	 rele-
vant	in	MSME	cases.	As	noted	above,	the	insolvency	standard	use-
fully	provides	specific	details	on	the	steps	that	management	may	









board	meetings	 to	monitor	 the	 situation;	 seeking	 profes-
sional	advice,	 including	insolvency	or	legal	advice;	holding	
discussions	 with	 auditors;	 calling	 a	 shareholder	 meeting;	
modifying	 management	 practices	 to	 take	 account	 of	 the	
interests	 of	 creditors	 and	 other	 stakeholders;	 protecting	
the	 assets	 of	 the	 company	 so	 as	 to	 maximize	 value	 and	
avoid	 loss	 of	 key	 assets;	 considering	 the	 structure	 and	
functions	of	 the	business	 to	examine	viability	and	 reduce	
expenditure;	not	committing	the	company	to	the	types	of	
transaction	 that	 might	 be	 subject	 to	 avoidance	 unless	
there	is	an	appropriate	business	justification;	continuing	to	
trade	in	circumstances	where	it	is	appropriate	to	do	so	to	
maximize	 going	 concern	 value;	 holding	 negotiations	with	
creditors	or	commencing	other	 informal	procedures,	such	
as	 voluntary	 restructuring	 negotiations;	 (b)	 Commencing	




tion;	 seeking	 professional	 advice,	 including	 insolvency	 or	 legal	




that	at	 times	approaching	 insolvency,	 the	debtor	should	operate	
in	the	interests	of	the	general	body	of	the	business’	stakeholders,	
and	 actively	 attempt	 to	 avoid	 insolvency	 or	 minimize	 its	 effect.	
The	 manner	 to	 discharge	 the	 obligation	 is,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	
through	proper	consideration	of	the	alternative	solutions	(media-
tion,	 debtor-in-possession,	 supervised	 rescue	 process	 etc.)	 pro-
vided	in	the	MSME	insolvency	framework	and,	on	the	other	hand,	











as	 a	workout,	 and	 the	 debtor	may	 be	 liable	 only	 if	 the	workout	
attempt	was	abusive.	
To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 debtor	 requires	 assistance,	 in	 order,	 for	
example,	 to	 be	 able	 to	 enter	 negotiations	 with	 creditors	 or	 to	
produce	 a	 rescue	 plan,	 he/she	 should	 seek	 such	 assistance	 pro-
vided	 by	 relevant	 institutions,	 such	 as	 mediators	 or	 counselling	
services.120	In	 other	 words,	 the	 regime	 for	 debtor	 obligations	 in	
the	vicinity	of	insolvency,	in	particular	the	delineation	of	the	obli-





The	obligation	 to	 take	 the	 steps	 to	avoid	 insolvency	or	minimize	
its	effect	should	arise	when	the	debtor	knows	or	ought	reasonably	
to	have	known	about	the	financial	distress,	in	accordance	with	the	
insolvency	 standard	 for	 directors’	 obligations.	 However,	 the	 tai-
lored	regime	for	MSMEs	may	further	clarify	how	such	knowledge	
will	be	established.	Thus,	small	debtors	should	be	expected	to	be	

























The	 regime	 should	 specify	 this	 primary	 consequence	 clearly,	 en-
suring	 that	 small,	 incorporated,	 debtors	 are	 aware	 that	 the	pro-
tection	of	 limited	 liability	might	be	 removed	 in	 circumstances	of	
breach.	
It	should	be	further	explained	that	more	severe	sanctions	may	be	
imposed	 in	more	 serious	cases	of	misbehaviour.	As	noted	 in	 the	
insolvency	 standard,	 the	 liability	 to	 compensate	 creditors	 for	
damage	caused	due	to	the	breach	of	the	obligation	does	not	pre-
clude	 imposing	 other	 remedies	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 payment	 of	
compensation,	for	example	the	disqualification	of	a	director	from	
acting	as	company	director	 for	a	specified	period	of	 time.	 It	also	
does	 not	 preclude	 holding	 directors	 accountable	 for	 fraudulent	
activities,	 including	 through	taking	criminal	actions	against	direc-
tors.123		
The	 regime	 should	 also	 accommodate	 the	 cases	 of	 unincorpo-
rated	 entities,	 by	 including	 the	 bankruptcy-related	 restrictions	
discussed	later	in	this	Part,124	within	the	regime	for	debtor	obliga-
tions	at	times	of	distress.	Measures	such	as	disqualification	from	
taking	 directorship	 roles	 in	 the	 future,	 restrictions	 on	borrowing	
and	 inclusion	of	 negative	 information	 in	 the	 credit	 history	 agen-
cies	could	be	imposed	in	relevant	circumstances	of	breach	of	the	
debtor	pre-insolvency	obligations.	 In	 relevant	 circumstances,	 the	








have	 perverse	 incentives	 to	 pressurize	 the	 debtor	 to	 pay	 their	





























commentary	 to	 the	 insolvency	 standard	notes	 the:	 “…	 increased	
risk	of	 unexpected	 liabilities	 for	banks	 and	others	who	might	be	





























funding	 is	even	more	pronounced	since	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 there	will	
be	 insufficient	funds	available	 in	the	estate	to	pursue	the	debtor	
or	other	persons.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	particularly	 important	 that	 the	
regime	considers	ways	to	address	funding	issues.		
The	 insolvency	 standard	 on	 directors’	 obligations	 at	 times	 ap-
proaching	 insolvency	 delineates	 certain	 means	 for	 obtaining	 al-
ternative	funding,	in	particular	the	assignment	of	claims	for	value	
to	 a	 third	 party.130	It	 also	 recommends	 that	 the	 law	 specify	 that	
the	costs	of	an	action	against	the	person	owing	the	obligations	be	




functions	to	the	best	 interest	of	creditors.	 If	 it	 is	 in	such	 interest	
that	 directors	 be	 made	 liable	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	 insolvency	
estate,	the	representatives	must	start	the	actions.	The	problem	of	


























Importantly,	 the	 regime	 should	 be	 viewed	 and	 be	 utilized	 as	 an	
educational	 tool,	 complementing	 the	 general	 framework	 for	
MSME	insolvency	and	ensuring	that	debtors	make	full	and	proper	






While	 the	wrongful	 trading	approach	 is	 the	preferred	approach	where	
there	 is	 sufficient	 level	of	 information,	 a	developed	market	and,	espe-
cially,	a	technically	prepared	judiciary,	other	alternatives	might	be	more	
suitable	to	the	circumstances	in	jurisdictions	that	lack	such	features.	The	
main	 alternative	 approach	would	 be	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 duty	 to	
file.	 Poor	 corporate	 governance	 and	 insufficiently	 trained	 and	 skilled	
directors,	 a	 rather	 widespread	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 MSME	 context,	
might	require	a	clear-cut,	and	even	easier	 to	apprehend	rule	on	which	
to	base	the	liability	of	directors.	Indeed,	the	insufficiency	and	inadequa-
cy	 of	 accounting	 information,	 particularly	 common	 in	 the	 context	 of	





debtor´s	management	on	 the	eve	of	 insolvency.	While	more	 rigid,	 the	
duty	to	file	constitutes	a	somewhat	clearer	rule	that	works	as	a	stricter	
ex	 ante	 corporate	 governance	 incentive,	 although	 the	 experience	 in	
systems	 that	 subscribe	 to	 the	duty	 to	 file	 regime	 (e.g.	Germany)	 show	
that	 uncertainty	 still	 exists	with	 regard	 to	 the	 point	 in	 time	when	 the	
duty	 arises.	 When	 opting	 for	 one	 system	 or	 the	 other,	 the	 legislator	
would	do	well	to	take	all	considerations	into	account.134			
Duty	to	file	systems	have	different	designs:		
• In	 some	 countries,	 the	 breach	 of	 the	 duty	 to	 file	 is	
treated	as	 a	 criminal	 offence	 (e.g.	Germany,	Poland).	
While	this	approach	would	seem	like	a	very	powerful	
incentive,	practice	shows	that	it	does	not	always	work	
effectively.	 In	Germany,	 the	 involvement	of	 a	 district	








the	civil	 liability	 following	a	breach	of	 the	duty,	 since	
relevant	 documents	 are	 seized	 by	 law	 enforcement	




nal	 liability	 usually	 carries	 a	 higher	 burden	 of	 proof	
than	civil	liability),	and	hence	the	system	backfires.	In-
effectiveness	 of	 criminal	 law	 based	 regimes	 is	 also	
possibly	 linked	with	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 type	of	offence	
does	not	often	bring	about	a	duty	to	compensate	the	
damage	 caused,	 and	 hence	 there	 is	 not	 sufficient	 in-
centives	 for	 the	parties	 to	 act	 (i.e.,	 inform	 the	public	
prosecutor,	or	request	the	judge	to	do	so).		
• When	 the	 breach	 of	 a	 duty	 to	 file	 brings	 about	 the	
need	 to	 compensate	 and	 pay	 damages,	 there	 are	





creditors	 for	 the	amount	 they	did	not	 receive	 follow-
ing	 the	 liquidation	 of	 the	 business.	 This	 latter	 ap-
proach	 constitutes	 a	 civil	 sanction	 and	 is	 therefore	
more	akin	to	the	criminal	law	based	solution.		




Germany136),	 the	 breach	 only	 creates	 a	 presumption	
of	“negligence”,	that	the	debtor,	or	directors,	may	re-
but	if	they	proved	that	their	behaviour	was	objectively	
conducted	 with	 a	 view	 to	 minimize	 the	 damage	 to	
creditors.137	This	approach	may	also	be	used	to	foster	












to	 creditors	 or	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	 business.	 This	 ap-
proach,	 while	 more	 balanced,	 might	 be	 difficult	 to	






financial	distress	at	 an	early	 stage.	 In	 the	usual	 case,	 the	debtor	
may	be	able	to	remain	in	control	over	the	process	and	resolve	the	
distress	 situation	 with	minimal	 or	 no	 involvement	 of	 insolvency	
professionals	and	minimal	or	no	court	intervention.	This	situation	
is	 the	 default	 position	 of	 the	 regime.	 This	 way,	 costs	 are	 mini-
mized,	 the	 debtor	 expertise	 and	 valuable	 private	 information	 is	
not	lost	and	the	debtor	is	able	to	recover	from	the	distress	situa-
tion	 more	 smoothly. 138 	In	 particular,	 the	 debtor-in-possession	
approach	 provides	 an	 important	 incentive	 that	 can	 encourage	
debtors	 to	 utilize	 the	MSME	 framework	 and	possibly	 rescue	 the	
business	if	it	is	still	viable.	For	natural	persons,	the	framework	also	
offers	a	discharge	releasing	the	individual	from	his/her	debts	and	
from	 bankruptcy	 restrictions.	 The	 discharge	 also	 incentivizes	






• Debtors	may	be	overly	 incentivized	 to	access	a	 “friendly”	
regime,	at	the	expense	of	the	creditors.	They	may	opt	for	a	
rescue	 process	 that	 allows	 them	 to	 stay	 in	 control	 even	
where	 they	 lack	 the	skill	 to	address	 the	 financial	distress.	
Although	 in	 the	usual	MSME	case,	 the	small	business	will	
be	 managed	 by	 a	 single	 or	 a	 handful	 of	 individual	 own-











afford	 the	 services	 of	 professional	 advisers	 to	 assist	 in	
making	appropriate	decisions	at	times	of	financial	difficul-
ties.	 They	 may,	 therefore,	 make	 decisions	 regarding	 the	
relevant	 insolvency	 solution	 (the	 options	 available	 under	
the	Modular	Approach)	that	could	be	detrimental	to	credi-
tors.	 The	 doomed-to-failure	 module	 discussed	 above139	
addresses	this	risk	by	allowing	a	majority	of	creditors	with	
claims	 large	enough	 to	 veto	a	debtor’s	plan	 to	 terminate	
debtor-initiated	rescue	proceedings.		
• Generally,	 debtors	 may	 have	 a	 strong	 incentive	 to	 file	 if	
they	 know	 that	 they	 remain	 in	 control.	 ‘Wishful	 thinking’	
may	 drive	 debtors	 to	 attempt	 a	 reorganization	 path,	 in	
particular,	 if	 they	 know	 that	 they	 remain	 in	 possession,	
and	even	if	it	is	not	a	viable	solution	in	the	circumstances,	
where	 it	 might	 merely	 prolong	 an	 inevitable	 liquidation	
outcome.		
• In	other	circumstances,	creditors	may	have	close	relation-
ship	 with	 one	 creditor,	 likely	 the	 main	 lender,	 and	 may	
seek	a	process	that	is	to	that	creditor’s	benefit,	neglecting	
the	interests	of	the	creditors	as	a	group.	
• MSMEs	may	 attempt	 to	 exploit	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 insol-
vency	 framework,	 the	 discharge	 in	 particular,	 without	
providing	sufficient	information	on	their	affairs	and	activi-
ties.	Generally,	MSMEs	are	prone	to	operating	with	limited	
transparency	and	 limited	monitoring	of	 the	accounts	 and	
financial	affairs	in	their	ordinary	course	of	business	due	to	
restricted	 resources	 and	 laxer	 disclosure	 regulation.	 They	




• Individual	 debtors	 may	 also	 be	 driven	 to	 incur	 excessive	
debt	at	the	expense	of	creditors,	knowing	that	they	can	be	














se	 issues	 and	proposes	 solutions	 to	enhance	 the	 governance	 re-




A	 robust	 governance	 regime	 that	 can	 mitigate	 the	 risks	 noted	
above	is	critical	for	the	proper	functioning	of	the	MSME	insolven-




The	 insolvency	 standard	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 an	 effective	
governance	 regime	 in	 the	 course	 of	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 In	
this	 respect,	 a	 system	 that	 is	 perceived	 too	 debtor-friendly	may	
result	 in	 creditor	 apathetic	 behaviour	 and	 lack	of	 interest	 in	 the	
process.141	
In	 this	 regard,	 it	 should	 first	be	acknowledged	 that	although	 the	
proposed	approach	for	MSME	insolvency	contains	some	degree	of	
granularity,	 it	 leaves	 room	 for	 jurisdictions	 to	 adopt	 different	
forms	of	debtor-led	processes,	 in	particular,	 in	terms	of	the	level	
of	court	involvement,	to	address	specific	challenges	in	the	system.	
It	 is	 important	 that	 jurisdictions	 consider	 the	manner	 in	which	a	
debtor-in-possession	procedure	might	 be	 implemented	 and	how	
it	is	integrated	with	other	aspects	of	the	system.		
Additionally,	while	 the	debtor-in-possession	process	 is,	 in	 princi-
ple,	 the	 preferred	 default	 approach,	 the	 framework	 for	 MSMEs	
should	also	contemplate	means	to	address	the	risks	it	entails.	The	
flexibility	 of	 the	 Modular	 Approach	 should	 be	 accompanied	 by	




















istration	of	 the	business	 for	 the	period	the	procedure	 is	ongoing	
and	a	decision	 is	 to	be	adopted	on	 the	 final	exit	 to	 the	business	
crisis.	 Typically,	 this	 limitation,	 which	 will	 apply	 to	 the	 different	
typology	of	the	debtor-in-possession	situations,	will	not	allow	the	
debtor	 to	 enter	 into	 transactions	 outside	 the	ordinary	 course	of	
its	business	activity.	In	other	words,	until	the	destiny	of	the	busi-
ness	 is	decided,	 the	debtor	must	observe	a	 low	risk	profile	 in	 its	
activity.	In	cases	where	an	extraordinary	act	of	disposition	is	nec-
essary,	 it	 should	 only	 be	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 authorization	 of	
the	court	or	the	relevant	insolvency	agency.		
b) Addressing	information	gaps	
One	 of	 the	 main	 obstacles	 to	 the	 proper	 implementation	 of	 a	
MSME	 system,	 and	 a	major	 contributing	 cause	of	 debtor	misbe-
haviour	 is	 the	absence	of	adequate	 information	 in	the	MSME	 in-
solvency	 process.	 An	 effective	 MSME	 insolvency	 system	 would	
work	 substantially	 better	 if	 the	 debtor	 provides	 the	 necessary	
information	and	is	willing	and	available	to	collaborate	throughout	
the	 entire	 procedure.	 In	 some	 cases,	 and	 in	 some	 jurisdictions,	
however,	 particularly	 in	 the	 less	 developed	 economies,	 the	 very	
existence	 of	 the	 information	 cannot	 be	 taken	 for	 granted.	 This	
section	discusses	both	 the	 issue	of	 the	debtor	obligations	 to	 co-
operate	and	provide	information	and	the	issue	of	absence	of	such	
information,	 suggesting	means	 to	 enhance	 the	 availability	 of	 in-





tions	 of	MSME	debtors	 and	properly	match	 these	 obligations	 to	
the	 different	 types	 of	 procedures	 contemplated	 by	 the	Modular	
Approach.	 Importantly,	 the	regime	should	be	premised	on	coop-
eration	 in	 good	 faith	 between	 the	debtor	 and	 the	 creditors,	 the	




information	 regarding	 the	debtor’s	 finances	 and	activities	 to	 the	
extent	and	in	the	measure	designed	by	the	jurisdiction.		
As	noted	above,	the	insolvency	standard	stresses	the	importance	
of	 a	 robust	 governance	 regime	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 insolvency	
proceedings.	 The	 standard	 further	 delineates	 the	 recommended	
debtor’s	 obligations,	 to	 the	 insolvency	 representative,	 the	 court	
or	the	creditors,	after	the	commencement	of	and	throughout	the	
insolvency	 process.	 These	 obligations	 are	 relevant	 in	 the	MSME	
context	as	well	and	would	include:	assisting	the	representative	to	
perform	 its	 duties;	 providing	 accurate,	 reliable	 and	 complete	 in-
formation	 regarding	 the	 financial	 position	 and	 business	 affairs;	
cooperation	to	enable	the	representative	to	take	effective	control	
of	 the	 estate	 and	 to	 facilitate	 or	 cooperate	 the	 recovery	 by	 the	
representative	 of	 the	 assets;	 and	 notifying	 the	 court	 about	 any	
intention	 to	 leave	 the	 habitual	 residence	 or	 move	 the	 debtor’s	
headquarters.142	
In	 particular,	 the	 standard	 stresses	 that	 a	 reorganization	 option	
should	 be	 conditioned	 on	 the	 continuing	 obligation	 to	 provide	
adequate	 information	about	 the	debtor’s	business	and	affairs.143	
To	 the	extent	 that	 the	MSME	debtor	 lacks	 the	means	 to	comply	
with	 this	 obligation,	 he/she	 should	 seek	 the	 appointment	 of	 an	
adviser	who	 could	 assist	 in	 the	 process.	 The	 institutional	 frame-
work	 for	MSME	 insolvency	 should	 support	 and	 complement	 this	
obligation	through	the	setting	up	of	debt	counselling	services	and	
through	 requirements	 imposed	 on	 relevant	 agencies	 to	 provide	
information	 about	 troubled	 businesses,	 as	 further	 discussed	 be-
low.	
Requirements	concerning	transparency,	good	faith	and	full	disclo-
sure	 should	 be	 embedded	 in	 all	 the	 procedures	 in	 the	Modular	




the	debtors	 should	 take	place	 in	 good	 faith	 and	 that	 the	debtor	















ket	 economy.	 Without	 proper,	 reliable,	 comparable	 financial	





the	 smaller	 the	 business	 is.	 Especially	 in	 developing	 economies,	




and	 awareness	 campaigns	 are	 very	 scarce.146 	MSMEs	 conduct	
their	 activity	 “the	 way	 it’s	 always	 been”,	 with,	 at	 best,	 home-
based	accounting	practices.	This	situation	is	incompatible	with	the	
proper	 development	 of	 the	 MSME	 sector,	 and,	 hence,	 of	 the	
economy	 of	 a	 given	 jurisdiction.	 An	 adequate	 level	 of	 formality	
and,	more	precisely,	sufficient	financial	 information,	are	key	to	a	
workable	system	to	tackle	MSME	insolvency.	Without	it,	access	to	
finance	 is	 limited,	 risk	 seems	 higher,	 and	 therefore	 the	 price	 of	
financing	 is	 also	more	 expensive.	 In	 case	 of	 financial	 difficulties,	
out	of	court	agreements	are	hindered,	many	insolvency	tools	are	
useless	 (liability	 of	 directors,	 avoidance	 actions,	 etc.),	 and	 there	
are	perverse	 incentives	 to	destroy	value	by	owners	of	distressed	



















Despite	 its	 importance,	 there	 is	 a	 downside	 to	 the	 implementa-
tion	 of	 a	 fully-fledged	 system	 of	 accounting	 and	 financial	 infor-
mation:	it	is	expensive.	The	smaller	the	business,	the	less	reason-
able	it	 is	to	impose	excessive	accounting	duties.	These	objectives	
can	 act	 as	 access	 barriers,	 as	 well	 as	 demand	 an	 investment	 of	
time	and	training	that	the	smaller	economic	units	may	not	be	able	
to	afford.	Too	much	across	 the	board	 increase	 in	 the	accounting	
duties	of	MSMEs	may	place	an	excessive	burden	on	some	of	these	
businesses	and	be	counterproductive.	 It	 is	necessary	 to	design	a	
system	 of	 financial	 information	 that	 maximizes	 the	 amount	 of	
information	while	minimizing	additional	costs;	one	that	identifies	
the	 key	 information	 to	 be	 provided,	 makes	 it	 compulsory,	 and	
leaves	 other	 information	 as	 optional;	 a	 system	 that	 is	 able	 to	
properly	 segment	 the	 spectrum	 of	 businesses	 into	 different	
groups	with	duties	of	diverse	intensity.		
This	 approach	 is	well	 consolidated	 in	 the	 accounting	 profession.	
The	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards	(“IFRS”)	take	into	
consideration	 the	 size	 and	 complexity	 of	 the	 business	 to	 gauge	
the	accounting	needs,147	and	most	countries	with	well-developed	
systems	include	lower	information	standards	for	the	smaller	mar-
ket	 participants.	 However,	 the	 differences	 reflected	 in	 IFRS	 and	
international	 practice	 do	 not	 always	 cover	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	








The	 solution	 of	 this	 wide-spread	 problem	 concerning	 lack	 of	 in-












measures	 that	 involve	 the	 debtor,	 the	 creditors	 and	 the	 institu-
tional	 framework	generally.	 Furthermore,	 the	measures	may	not	
only	 stem	 from	 the	 insolvency	or	pre-insolvency	 framework,	but	
also	involve	a	number	of	general	corporate	and	commercial	 laws	
and	the	institutions	in	charge	of	implementing	them.	
In	 particular,	 the	 information-enhancing	 system	 needs	 to	 be	
cheap,	 efficient	 and	 have	 the	 capacity	 of	 offering	 bespoke	 solu-




fication.	 These	 templates	 could	 be	 prepared	 by	 the	
agency	 in	 charge	of	 the	 implementation	of	 the	 insol-
vency	 system,	 but	 it	 would	 be	 more	 efficient	 if	 the	
pre-defined	 information	models	 are	prepared	 for	 the	
general	 accounting	 requirements	 of	 businesses,	 not	
just	 for	 the	 preparation	 of	 an	 insolvency	 petition.	
Templates	should	be	free	of	cost	and	be	openly	avail-
able—downloadable—	from	the	relevant	website.	The	
business/companies	 registrar	 is	 a	 clear	 candidate	 for	
the	 provision	 of	 the	 templates.	 Digitalization	 and	 on	
line	solutions,	even	for	delivery	of	the	accounts,	would	































• Legal	 requirements	 of	 financial	 information	 may	 be	
subdivided	 into	more	 groups	 of	 businesses	 based	 on	
their	 size	 and	 complexity.	 Instead	 of	 having	 just	 two	
types	of	legal	requirements,	as	is	the	case	in	many	ju-
risdictions:	general	and	abbreviated	financial	account-
ing	 duties	 depending	 on	 size,	 having	 more	 divisions	
would	 allow	 for	 a	 more	 bespoke	 solution	 and	 may	
help	 maximize	 the	 equation	 referred	 to	 above.	 This	
granulation	would	 be	 especially	 relevant	 for	MSMEs,	
the	smallest	part	of	the	business	spectrum.	Legal	obli-
gations	 and	 templates	 would	 be	 designed	 for	 these	
businesses.	 In	 order	 to	 mirror	 banking	 practice	 with	
non-performing	loans,	segmentation	of	debtors	would	
also	 favour	 restructuring	 options	 and	 bespoke	 solu-
tions.		
• In	any	case,	the	main	elements	of	financial	accounting	






task.	 Non-compliance	 with	 this	 duty	 ought	 to	 bring	





The	 existence	 of	 sufficient	 and	 adequate	 financial	 information	
should	not	only	lay	on	the	shoulders	of	debtors.	The	active	partic-
ipation	of	other	stakeholders,	directly	 involved	with	the	business	
life	of	debtors,	 is	paramount	 in	 this	 regard.	 Information	on	trou-







bank/financial	 institution,	 the	 risk	 assessment	 should	
be	based	on	the	provision	of	sufficient	information	by	




er	 debtor	 moral	 hazard	 using	 financing	 instruments	
that	 are	 periodically	 renewed	 against	 good	 business	
behaviour,	 or	 by	 the	 use	 of	 banks’	 current	 accounts	
and	 other	 financial	 products	 that	 allow	 for	 the	 daily	
monitoring	 of	 financial	 positions.	 The	 inclusion	 of	
“early	warning”	signs	 in	their	tracking	of	the	debtor´s	
performance	 constitutes	 a	 very	 useful	 tool	 to	 avoid	
value	destruction	and	late	insolvency	filings.	Their	risk	
management	 practices	 could,	 therefore,	 if	 properly	
designed	and	 implemented,	 contribute	 greatly	 to	en-
hancing	 the	 financial	 information	 of	 the	 debtor.	
Hence,	 banking	 supervisors	 have	 the	 key	 to	 contrib-
uting	to	the	market	system	by	ensuring	adequate	risk	
management	 and	monitoring	 practices.	 Often	 banks,	
especially	in	the	MSME	and	retail	sectors,	have	granu-





tion	with	 insolvency	 representatives,	 public	 agencies,	




• Financial	 information	 systems:149	Credit	 history	 con-
tained	 in	 credit	 information	 systems	 is	 not	 only	 im-
portant	 for	 the	 moment	 of	 credit	 origination.	 It	 can	
constitute	a	key	informational	tool	when	the	business	
reaches	 a	 state	 of	 distress,	 either	 to	 allow	 for	 its	 re-










practices.	 A	 comprehensive	 credit	 report	 would	 in-




that	 the	 information	 recorded	 in	 credit	 information	
systems	 is	 kept	 within	 the	 circle	 of	 financial	 institu-
tions.	 The	 information,	 or	 some	 of	 it,	 could	 benefit	
other	 credit	 providers,	 including	 suppliers	 and	 other	






formation	 about	 the	 debtor´s	 business.	 Goods	 and	
services	 and	 value-added	 taxes	 and	 corporate	 taxes	
should	 provide	 indications	 and	 warning	 signs	 of	 the	
state	 of	 a	 debtor´s	 business.	 Even	 the	 lack	 of	 infor-
mation	 (i.e.,	 delays	 in	 filing	 tax	 returns)	 is,	 in	 itself,	 a	
very	useful	warning	sign	of	trouble.	In	some	countries,	
yearly	declaration	of	 the	value	of	certain	assets	 is	 re-
quired,	and	even,	from	time	to	time,	a	mandatory	uni-
versal	declaration	of	goods.	The	existence	of	investiga-
tion	 concerning	 misbehaviour	 (untaxed	 services	 ren-
dered,	untaxed	payments,	etc.)	 is	 also	 relevant	 infor-
mation	 for	 the	 insolvency	 of	 the	 debtor	 and	 the	 as-
sessment	of	 the	behaviour	of	 its	directors	or	control-
ling	shareholders.		
• Other	 government	 entities:	 In	 those	 countries	where	
there	 is	 a	 public	 system	 of	 social	 security,	 all	 infor-
mation	 concerning	 compliance	with	 the	 debtor´s	 du-
ties	 in	 this	 regard	 can	 be	 substantial.	 It	 should	 also	
serve	 as	 an	 early	 warning	 sign	 of	 business	 trouble.	
Other	 entities	 that	 hold	 relevant	 information	 are	
those	 public	 registries	 where	 security	 rights	 over	 as-
sets	of	the	debtor	are	registered.		
• Financial	 and	 governance	 education:	 Finally,	 govern-
ment	agencies	can	play	a	key	role	by	ensuring	there	is	
a	 proper	 system	 of	 financial	 education	 to	 the	MSME	
sector,	 including	 training	 of	 entrepreneurs	 and	 com-
pany	directors	on	good	corporate	governance,	briefing	
on	financial	accounting	duties	and	where	and	how	to	
obtain	 valuable	 resources,	 awareness	 creation	 cam-
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through	 the	 channels	 described	 above,	 some	 important	 infor-
mation	can	actually	be	obtained.	The	main	problem	is	locating	the	
information,	collating	it	and	centralizing	it	in	the	right	institution.	
There	 is	 a	 need	 to	 devise	 a	 system	 that	 allows	 for	 the	 relevant	
information	 to	 flow	 and	 be	 shared.	 Mechanisms	 should	 be	 de-
signed	 to	 ensure	 that	 information	 from	public	 agencies	 (e.g.	 tax	
authorities),	 registries,	 credit	 information	 systems	and	 the	bank-
ing	sector	are	made	available	to	the	insolvency	court	in	insolvency	
cases,	or	even,	under	adequate	control,	 to	 the	parties	 in	out-of-





requirements	 to	 access	 insolvency	 or	 hybrid	 pre-insolvency	 pro-
ceedings	may	have	counterproductive	effects.	If	a	debtor	has	not	




of	 the	 business	 as	 a	 consequence.	 Further,	 during	 formal	 bank-
ruptcy	 proceedings,	 the	 debtor´s	 effort	 to	 produce	 adequate	 fi-
nancial	information	could	arguably	be	less	necessary,	where	there	








The	 risk	 that	 debtors	 will	 exploit	 the	MSME	 framework	 and	 act	
self-servingly,	 recklessly	 or	 with	 insufficient	 skill	 should	 be	 ad-
dressed	 primarily	 through	 the	 proper	 design	 of	 the	 procedural	
framework.	As	discussed	above,	the	regime	should	prescribe	strict	
timeframes,	duties	 to	cooperate	and	 to	provide	 information	and	





through	 creditor	monitoring,	 the	debtor	will	 not	be	 able	 to	pro-
long	 the	 procedures	 and	 creditors	will	 be	 able	 to	 address	 prob-
lems	of	mismanagement.	
Yet,	 the	 system	 should	 also	 include	 sanctions	 that	 may	 be	 im-
posed	on	the	debtor	in	order	to	ensure	compliance	with	the	pre-
scribed	duties,	 to	address	 instances	of	misuse	of	 the	framework,	
deter	certain	type	of	misconduct	and	protect	the	public	from	re-
peat	abuse.150	Sanctions	may	be	 imposed	on	the	 individuals	con-




















As	 a	 general	 rule,	 though,	 the	 system	 should	 strive	 to	provide	a	
“fresh	 start”	 to	 insolvent	debtors.	 The	 focus	of	 the	MSME	 insol-












neurial	 activity	 and	 risk-taking	 and	 combat	 the	 negative	 stigma	
associated	with	 bankruptcy.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 sanctions	 in-
cluded	in	the	regime	should	be	imposed	in	a	robust	manner	in	the	
appropriate	circumstances,	and	should	not	be	mere	“dead	letters”	
in	 the	 law.	The	court	 should	be	able	 to	compel	debtors	 to	meet	






insolvency	 standard.155	Thus,	 the	 discharge	 may	 be	 refused	 or	
suspended	 in	 circumstances	 of	 breach	 of	 accounting	 duties.156	
Furthermore,	certain	categories	of	debts	may	not	be	released	on	





































propriate	 in	 circumstances	 where	 debtor	 conduct	 adversely	 af-
fects	the	proceedings	(e.g.	where	the	debtor	fails	to	deliver	prop-
erty	 or	 to	 provide	 information)	 and	 the	 discharge	 may	 be	 sus-
pended	 for	 an	 undefined	 period	 until	 the	 debtor	 fulfils	 certain	
conditions	 (but	 not	 indefinitely).159	Regard	 may	 be	 given	 to	 cir-
cumstances	where	it	is	clear	that	the	debtor	is	not	in	a	position	to	
provide	 the	 information	or	property,	or	where	 it	 is	not	cost	effi-
cient	to	further	delay	the	discharge.160	
Further	 restrictions	 may	 be	 imposed	 on	 the	 debtor	 during	 the	
process,	 as	 well	 as	 post-discharge,	 for	 a	 certain	 period	 of	 time,	

































approval	 of	 the	 court	 or	 of	 another	 relevant	 agency	 or	
quasi-judicial	authority.163		
Restrictions	 on	 taking	 part	 in	 company	 management:	
Debtors	 (individual	 sole	 traders	 or	 managers	 of	 incorpo-
rated	MSMEs)	may	be	 restricted	or	disqualified	 from	act-
ing	as	directors	of	companies	or	 from	taking	part	 in	com-






Information	 in	 credit	 history	 records:	 Information	 about	
the	debtor	insolvency	may	be	kept	for	a	specified	period	of	
time	 in	 the	 records	 at	 credit	 history	 bureaus.	 Credit	 bu-
reaus	can	also	have	a	major	impact	on	the	debtor’s	ability	
to	 start	 afresh,	 and	 therefore,	 the	 restriction	 should	 be	
imposed	carefully,	in	circumstances	of	misconduct.		
The	system	should	further	include,	either	within	the	MSME	insol-
vency	 legislation	 or	 in	 criminal	 legislation,	 criminal	 sanctions	 for	
insolvency	offences	for	which	the	punishment	may	be	a	fine,	or	in	
some	 instances,	 imprisonment	 for	 up	 to	 a	 certain	 number	 of	
years.	Such	sanctions	may	be	imposed	in	circumstances	of	serious	
offences	such	as	falsification	of	documents	in	a	material	manner,	


















with	 precision	 and	 specificity	 and	 are	 limited	 to	 severe	miscon-
duct.167	
The	 court	 should	 also	 have	 the	 power	 to	 address	 reckless	 and	
fraudulent	behaviour	of	the	debtor	at	the	time	approaching	insol-
vency,168	and	 to	 undo	 transactions	 entered	 into	 by	 the	 MSME	
with	a	view	to	dissipating	or	reducing	the	value	of	its	assets	in	the	
period	 before	 insolvency.169	Insolvency	 law	 could	 include	 a	 pre-
sumption	of	misconduct	 or	 a	 presumption	 that	 the	 debtor´s	 be-
haviour	has	contributed	to	the	aggravation	of	insolvency	in	cases	








for	 company	 directors	 to	 comply	 with	 their	 accounting	 obliga-
tions.		
4. Education	and	advice	to	debtors	
Entrepreneurs	 are	 typically	 people	 with	 a	 certain	 mindset	 and	
spirit.	 They	 do	 not	 always,	 however,	 possess	 the	 education	 and	
skills	 to	monitor	 the	 financial	 situation	 of	 their	 business	 and	 to	




these	 areas,	 education	 is	 a	 useful,	 although	 certainly	 not	 exclu-
sive,	remedy.	Specific	knowledge	in	 insolvency	 law	or	accounting	
cannot	be	 taught	 to	every	small	entrepreneur.	 Instead,	a	combi-

























for	 director	 qualification	with	 regards	 to	 basic	 knowledge	 in	 ac-
counting,	 risk	 management	 and	 rescue	 options.	 For	 sole	 entre-
preneurs,	proper	 financial	and	 legal	education	could	be	 incentiv-
ized	by	tax	deductibility	of	educational	efforts.	














heavily	 influenced	 by	 the	 behaviour	 of	 creditors,	with	 particular	
















tors	 through	 the	 design	 of	 its	 options.172	Yet,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
operation	 of	 the	modular	 framework,	 consideration	 should	 also	
be	given	to	creditor	behaviour	and	the	influence	of	their	practices	
on	the	ability	of	the	MSME	system	to	function	properly.	
Experience	 in	 recent	 crises	 shows	 that	 creditors,	 particularly	 fi-







attention.	Often,	banks	 show	 little	 interest	 in	getting	 involved	 in	
the	rescue	of	a	 failing	business.	 Indeed,	creditor	passivity	consti-









These	 problems	 of	 creditor	 lending	 practices,	 creditor	 passivity,	



















In	 a	 standard	 case,	 a	MSME	will	 have	 commercial	 creditors,	 “le-
gal”	creditors	(i.e.,	those	creditors	whose	claims	arise	as	a	conse-
quence	of	the	law	such	as	tax	authorities	and	social	security	obli-
gations)	 and	 one—sometimes	 more—financial	 creditors.	 Com-
mercial	 creditors	 provide	 credit	 to	 MSMEs	 by	 supplying	 goods	
that	will	be	repaid	within	a	relative	short	period	of	time.	The	es-








Few	or	no	 recommendations	 in	 this	 report	 relate	 to	 commercial	
creditors.	They	should	be	allowed	to	operate	under	the	ordinary	
rules	of	the	market	and	manage	their	risk	as	they	see	fit.	It	would	
not	make	 sense	 for	 a	 legislator	 to	 impose	 certain	behaviours	on	







supervisor	 to	 ensure	 good	 practices.	 The	 following	 are	 areas	




based	 on	 the	 viability	 of	 the	 business	 project.174	Often	 in	
respect	 to	 MSMEs,	 this	 practice	 is	 not	 strictly	 observed.	
Banks	may	lend	only	where	the	debtor	provides	collateral	
and/or	 personal	 guarantees.	 However,	 often	 MSMEs	 do	
not	have	sufficient	collateral	to	finance	their	activity,	both	
at	 inception	or	during	 the	 life	of	 the	business.	Unsecured	













iour	 at	 the	 time	 of	 distress	 of	 the	 borrower.	 Thus,	 the	
higher	the	proportion	of	the	loan	covered	by	the	value	of	
the	collateral,	 the	 fewer	 incentives	banks	have	 to	engage	
in	a	restructuring	of	the	business.	The	type	of	security	also	





es.	 One	 way	 to	 improve	 this	 situation	 is	 by	 enacting	 a	
workable	system	of	security	over	movable	assets,	increas-
ing	 the	 types	 of	 security	 (an	 issue	 which	 is	 beyond	 the	
scope	of	this	report).		
The	regulatory	framework:	Banking	regulations,	especially	
those	 aimed	 at	 strengthening	 the	 position	 of	 banks	 as	
debtors,	may	 exert	 a	 strong	 influence	 on	 banking	 behav-





cessive	 regulatory	 forbearance	 could	 favour	 the	 implica-
tion	of	banks	in	restructuring	operations	at	the	cost	of	en-
dangering	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 banks’	 balance	 sheet.	 A	
balance	 needs	 to	 be	 struck	 in	 this	 regard,	 a	 balance	 that	
will	necessarily	 lay	with	a	segmented,	granular	analysis	of	
distressed	 loans,	 followed	by	an	active	 involvement	 in	re-
structuring	of	viable	businesses.	In	line	with	this	approach,	
for	example,	a	country	may	include	rules	that	allow	for	the	
reclassification	 of	 loans	 following	 the	 approval	 of	 a	 re-
structuring	 agreement,	 so	 long	 as	 it	 is	 a	 credible	 agree-









ness	where	 it	 is	viable.	At	times,	 the	amount	of	exposure	
or	 the	 over-collateralization	 of	 a	 loan	 will	 deter	 a	 bank	





Limited	 resources	 in	MSME	 insolvencies	 lead	 to	 very	 limited	 ex-
pectations	 for	unsecured	 creditors	 regarding	any	 substantial	dis-
tribution	 in	respect	of	their	claims.	Thus,	unsecured	creditors	of-
ten	have	 little	 incentive	 to	 incur	 further	 costs	 (e.g.,	 travel	 costs,	
communication	costs,	 investment	of	 time)	with	 regard	 to	 the	 in-
solvent	 debtor	 by	 participating	 actively	 in	 negotiations	 or	 pro-
ceedings.	 Overall,	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 a	 creditor	 not	 to	 participate	
unless	 it	has	a	special	 interest	 in	 the	 result	of	 the	proceedings	–	
most	notably	because	it	is	personally	connected	to	the	debtor	(by	
family	 ties,	 or	 as	 an	 employee),	 or	 where	 it	 appears	 that	 some	
value	may	be	recoverable.		
Secured	 creditors,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	 interested	 in	 the	 en-
forcement	of	 their	security,	which	usually	occurs	 through	sale	of	
the	debtor’s	assets.	This	interest	may	result	in	the	liquidation	and	
winding	 up	 of	 the	 debtor’s	 business.	 This	 type	 of	 enforcement	





The	Modular	 Approach	 seeks	 to	 overcome	 these	 rational	 obsta-
cles	 by	 counteracting	 the	 non-existing	 (unsecured	 creditors)	 or	
negative	(secured	creditors)	incentives	to	participate	in	court	pro-
ceedings,	while	 preserving	 the	 positive	 incentives	 of	 the	 benefi-
ciaries	 (debtor,	 connected	 persons).	 The	 default	 assumption	 is	
that,	 absent	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 a	 secured	 creditor	 may	
promptly	enforce	 its	 rights	under	 the	general	 law	and	as	agreed	
between	 the	 parties.	 This	 possibility	 incentivizes	 the	 debtor	 to	
invoke	a	preliminary	stay	of	enforcement,	and	to	propose	a	reha-
bilitation	plan.	Such	a	set	of	rules	would	also	mean	that	the	task	
of	 designing	 and	 preparing	 a	 plan	 is	 assigned	 to	 the	 debtor	 be-






ers	 do	 not	 contribute	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 viable	 businesses	 by	
not	even	taking	the	time	and	effort	to	consider	the	case.		
Confronted	with	 a	 plan,	 creditors	must	 not	 be	 bound	without	 a	
chance	to	be	heard,	for	constitutional	and	due	process	reasons	in	
most	 jurisdictions.	 The	Modular	 Approach	 seeks	 to	 lower	 credi-
tors’	participation	costs	through	online,	postal,	and	proxy	consul-
tation	and	voting.	At	the	same	time,	the	Modular	Approach	raises	
the	 costs	 of	 non-participation	 through	 “deemed	 approval”,	
whereby	a	creditor’s	failure	to	vote	is	regarded	as	a	vote	in	favour	
of	 the	 rehabilitation	 plan,	 and	 through	 “deemed	 waiver”,	 by	
which	 the	absence	of	 timely	objection,	 such	as	 to	 the	 suggested	
amount	of	their	claim	or	right,	is	treated	as	a	waiver	of	the	right	to	
judicial	 review.	 In	 sum,	 creditors’	 passivity	 after	 due	notification	





ing	 responsible	 credit	 borrowing	 and	 lending,	 responsible	 credit	
monitoring	and	responsible	credit	collection,	including,	if	need	be,	
credit	restructuring.		
Inspiration	 for	 a	 possible	 approach	 can	be	drawn	 from	 the	 legal	
regulation	of	workplace	accidents.	The	previous	unregulated	situ-
ation	was	 replaced	with	a	 system	 that	 compensates	workers	 for	
harms	experienced	 in	the	workplace	and	places	responsibility	on	
employers	for	creating	safe	workplaces,	most	effectively	promot-
ing	 aggregate	 social	 welfare.175	Similarly,	 a	 comprehensive	 ap-
proach	 to	 MSME	 insolvency	 suggests	 that	 professional	 lenders	
have	 some	 responsibility	 in	 lending	practices	 to	MSMEs,	 as	 they	















warning	 signs	 of	 financial	 distress. 176 		 One	 option	 under	 the	
Modular	Approach	is	to	require	the	observance	of	prudential	rules	
in	 the	 performance	 of	 lending	 activities,	 especially	 designed	 to	
reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 MSME	 insolvencies	 or	 to	 govern	 as	 much	 as	
possible	 their	 occurrence.	 Non-compliance	 with	 such	 especially	
designed	prudential	rules	could	be	sanctioned	by	using	taxation	as	
a	 leverage	 to	 discourage	 inappropriate	 conduct.	 Desirable	 con-
duct	could	be	encouraged	by	affirmative	tax	benefits.		
The	 two	 proposed	 lines	 of	 action—providing	 special	 prudential	
rules	and	using	tax	leverage	to	induce	compliance—must	be	seen	
as	 linked,	 since,	 unless	 they	 are	 taken	 together,	 their	 impact	
might	fail	to	be	significant.		
Virtually	 all	 national	 legal	 systems	 have	 banking	 regulations	
whose	institutional	goal	is	to	prescribe	the	observance	of	pruden-
tial,	 technical	 rules	 in	 the	 granting	 of	 credit;	 the	 monitoring	 of	
credit	granted	and	still	outstanding;	and	the	collection	of	due	and	
payable	 amounts	 or	 the	measures	 to	 be	 taken	 in	 respect	 of	 de-
faults.	These	national	regulatory	and	supervisory	systems,	howev-
er,	 should	 provide	 an	 adequate	 linkage	 with	 the	 fiscal	 conse-
quences	 of	 non-observance.	 Briefly	 stated,	 tax	 deductibility	 of	
losses	arising	 from	bad	claims	against	MSMEs	 should	not	be	au-




Lenders	 should	not	be	 threatened	with	 the	prospect	of	entering	




tory	 forms	 or	 conditions	 of	 credit	 contracts	 or	 of	 compulsory	
schemes	of	arrangement.	 	Accordingly,	 the	 legal	 format	of	 these	
rules	should	continue	to	be	issued	on	the	basis	of	the	rule-making	
power	entrusted	to	central	banks	or	other	top	central	regulators,	
permitting	 the	 much-needed	 technical	 flexibility	 that	 statutory	









easier	 to	 achieve	 forms	 of	 international	 informal	 cooperation	
among	regulators.177		
More	specifically,	 tax	deductibility	of	banking	 losses	arising	 from	
credit	granted	to	MSMEs	should	be	made	conditional	on	evidence	
provided	by	 the	 bank	 claiming	 the	 deduction	 of	 having	 properly	
complied	with:	(i)	prudential	rules	on	the	initial	granting	or	exten-
sion	 of	 the	 credit;	 (ii)	 prudential	 rules	 on	 the	monitoring	 of	 the	
credit	while	outstanding,	 including	 inter	alia	proper	classification	
of	 it	 in	 cases	of	 threatened	difficulty	of	 reimbursement;	 and	 (iii)	
prudential	rules	on,	initially,	collection	attempts	and,	subsequent-
ly,	 promotion	 of	 or	 participation	 in	 a	 serious	 workout	 arrange-





difficulties	 in	 application	 might	 arise	 depending	 on	 how	 banks	
would	be	required	to	give	evidence	of	compliance	with	the	insol-
vency-related	prudential	rules	at	the	time	of	claiming	the	relevant	
tax	 deduction.	 It	 would	 be	 unreasonable	 and	 impracticable	 to	
require	 a	 bank	 to	 provide	 a	 detailed	 history	 of	 any	 credit	 in	 re-
spect	of	which	the	tax	deduction	is	claimed.	Basically,	it	should	be	
enough	 for	 the	bank	 to	provide	evidence	 (as	 it	would	have	 to	 in	
the	case	of	a	central	bank	inspection)	that	the	credit	was	properly	
analyzed,	classified	and	granted	at	the	time	of	granting	and	that	it	

























including	but	not	 limited	 to	 the	debtor,	 to	 arrive	 at	one	of	 such	
solutions.179	
There	would	 be	 certain	 costs	 and	 benefits	 inherently	 associated	
with	this	advocated	proposal.		The	introduction	of	a	change	in	the	
traditional	 regulatory	 philosophy,	 with	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 pro-
active	pursuit	of	a	particular	MSME	credit	policy	in	addition	to	the	
traditional	 goal	 of	 ensuring	 the	 banking	 system’s	 stability,	 and	
strong	 linkage	 between	 prudential	 supervisory	 rules	 and	 tax	 de-
ductibility,	 are	 likely	 to	 initially	 cause	 an	 increase	 of	 regulatory	
costs.180		Such	costs	would	be	of	the	same	nature	as	that	which	is	
typically	 associated	 with	 changes	 in	 the	 contents	 of	 applicable	
legal	rules.	After	an	initial	period	of	cultural	adaptation,	the	bene-




ness	 in	 that	 there	would	be	 the	possibility	of	denial	of	expected	
tax	relief.	However,	to	the	extent	that	such	threat	may	incentivize	
the	 restructuring	 of	 old	 indebtedness	 and	 the	 consequential	 re-
classification	of	 the	“rehabilitated”	 restructured	part	of	 “old	bad	
claims”,	it	may	provide	a	new	opportunity	for	professional	lenders	
to	retain	more	value	in	the	reclassified	treatment	of	their	original	






















that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 assigned	 to	 such	 claims	 as	 a	 result	 of	
write-offs.	
Finally,	 what	 remains	 to	 be	 considered	 is	 the	 supply	 of	 new	 fi-
nance,	without	which	 a	 rescue	 plan	 is	 nearly	 always	 doomed	 to	
fail.	 If	new	finance	 is	provided	by	a	new	bank,	an	affirmative	tax	
incentive	 should	 be	 made	 automatically	 available	 by	 the	 fiscal	
legislation	 (e.g.,	 non-taxability	 of	 the	 income	 obtained	 from	 the	
new	finance	 for	a	specified	number	of	years).	 If	 the	new	finance	
comes	from	a	sole	or	leading	bank,	the	issue	of	the	tax	incentive	
might	be	treated	differently,	that	is,	by	articulating	an	appropriate	









is	 the	only	 real	 alternative.	 In	most	 jurisdictions,	but	particularly	
where	the	market	still	needs	development,	the	absence	of	a	res-
cue	culture	and	the	stigma	associated	with	it,	the	lack	of	an	ena-
bling	 legal	 framework,	 the	 lack	 of	 real	 possibilities	 to	 lower	 the	
risk	of	lending	for	small	debtors	(e.g.,	no	assets	free	for	collateral,	
limited	ability	 to	offer	personal	guarantees),	and	 the	passivity	of	
creditors,	 thwart	 the	 continuation	 of	 the	 business	 activity,	 frus-
trating	 chances	 of	 business	 recovery	 and	 value	 preservation.	 In	
this	light,	the	legal	and	institutional	frameworks	of	a	country	need	
to	 provide	 the	 mechanisms	 to	 ensure	 that	 troubled	 but	 viable	
businesses	are	able	to	access	financing	with	a	view	to	trading	out	
of	 their	 difficulties.	 Possible	 mechanisms	 to	 enhance	 access	 to	
finance	at	times	of	distress,	with	reference	to	relevant	key	stages	
of	MSME	insolvency	and	with	particular	consideration	of	the	spe-
cific	 problems	 encountered	 in	 the	MSME	 context,	 are	 discussed	
below.	The	position	of	the	debtor	that	went	through	the	insolven-





the	 size	 and	 range	of	 such	businesses.	 The	universal	 features	 to	




based	 on	 different	 socio-economic	 contexts	 and	 variety	 of	 legal	
traditions.	
		
	Stage	 I:	During	 the	 initial	 stages	of	 financial	 distress	 of	MSMEs,	
before	 formal	 insolvency	proceedings	have	been	petitioned	 (and	
precisely	with	a	 view	 to	avoiding	 that),	 the	debtor	often	 faces	 a	
number	 of	 challenges.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 as	 noted	 above,	 the	
debtor	may	 face	 lack	of	 interest	of	 financial	 creditors,	 especially	
creditors	that	enjoy	fixed	as	opposed	to	floating	security	over	val-
uable	 assets.	 The	 passivity	 will	 be	 even	 worse	 whenever	 the	 fi-
nancial	 creditors	have	 securitized	 their	 SME	 loan	portfolios.	 Fur-
ther,	 debtors,	 due	 to	 their	 size	 and	urgency	 of	 the	 financial	 dis-
tress,	 are	 placed	 in	 a	 very	 weak	 position	 vis-à-vis	 the	 financial	
creditor,	with	very	limited	leverage	in	the	negotiation.	This	situa-
tion	is	particularly	problematic,	since,	often,	the	key	to	overcom-
ing	 the	 problem	 of	 distress	 is	 to	 keep	 the	 business	 operating	
smoothly	 to	 retain	 the	 trust	 of	 commercial	 suppliers	 and	 other	





value	 of	 the	 business	 momentarily	 until	 an	 agreement,	 with	 an	










more)	 financial	 creditors	 and	 the	 public	 creditor	 (tax	 authorities	
and	social	security).		
The	 first	 challenge	 will	 be	 to	 get	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 financial	
creditors,	especially	in	cases	where	the	exposure	is	low	and	suffi-
cient	collateral	has	been	provided.182	In	some	cases,	an	additional	
problem	 that	 stems	 from	 the	 internal	 allocation	 of	 tasks	 within	
the	 financial	 institution	 is	 that	 the	 claim	 is	 sent	 to	 the	 recovery	
department;	there	is	no	longer	communication	with	the	commer-
cial/business	 origination	 department	 and	 the	 new	 department	
managing	the	loan	may	no	longer	have	an	interest	in	keeping	the	
business	relationship	alive.	Its	only	focus	will	be	on	recovery,	mak-
ing	 additional	 finance,	 or	 even	 a	 rescheduling,	 not	 a	 beneficial	






project,	 irrespective	 of	 their	 holding	 sufficient	 collateral	 or	 not.	
That	way,	viable	businesses	may	be	 rescued	and	 future	business	
for	the	bank	preserved.		
Irrespective	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 codes	 of	 conduct,	 keeping	
the	 “day	 zero	 level”	 of	 financing	 may	 be	 a	 difficult	 task.	 Often	
debtors	 will	 have	 no	 assets	 to	 provide	 as	 collateral	 for	 fresh	 fi-
nancing,	which	 is	why	the	optimization	of	a	 jurisdiction´s	system	
of	 secured	 transactions	 over	movable	 assets	 is	 key.	 Although	 all	
tangible	assets	may	already	be	“attached”,	 the	debtor	should	be	
able	 to	 resort	 to	 its	 immaterial	assets	 to	offer	creditors:	 security	
over	 inventory,	 receivables,	 non-intermediated	 non-certificated	
















provide	 tools	 to	 foster	 the	 financing	 of	 viable,	 troubled	 but	 not	
yet	insolvent,	businesses.	The	following	are	important	examples:	
• The	regulatory	framework	of	banks	may	increase	the	like-
lihood	 of	 MSME	 business	 rescue	 by	 designing	 balanced	
provisioning	 rules.	 Experience	 shows	 that	when	 rules	 are	
too	 strict	 and	 provisioning	 comes	 at	 a	 very	 early	 stage,	
banks	lose	interest	in	the	rescue	of	their	debtors.	Perhaps	





constitute	 a	 relevant	 incentive	 to	 facilitate	 agreements	
and	the	financing	that	often	comes	with	it.		





actions	 in	 case	 a	 subsequent	 insolvency	 proceeding	 en-
sues.		
Naturally,	 both	 the	 high	 priority	 and	 the	 protection	 from	 claw-
back	actions	in	failed	out-of-court	rescue	attempts	should	be	sub-
ject	 to	 a	 number	 of	 requirements:	 the	 agreement	 ought	 to	 be	
approved	 by	 a	 large	 percentage	 of	 creditors,	 or	 it	 should	 have	
certain	 characteristics	 that	make	 it	 objectively	 positive	 (i.e.,	 not	
damaging	 to	 non-participating	 creditors),	 or	 be	 subject	 to	 some	
sort	of	control	by	a	 judge	or	assessed	by	an	independent	expert.	
These	 measures	 would	 be	 put	 in	 place	 to	 avoid,	 among	 other	
problems,	banking	malpractice,	which,	although	rare,	is	not	to	be	
ruled	out.	The	strong	bargaining	position	of	the	financial	creditors	
may,	 in	 extreme	 cases,	 lead	 them	 to	 impose	 agreements	 that	
benefit	their	position	at	the	expense	of	the	rest	of	creditors.		
Often,	the	other	important	creditor	of	MSMEs	will	be	the	tax	au-
thority.	 Legislation	 regulating	 public	 creditors	 may	 also	 pose	 a	
very	 serious	 hurdle	 to	 business	 restructuring	 and,	 consequently,	
to	the	provision	of	new	financing:	
• It	 is	not	uncommon	 that	public	 creditors	are,	by	 law,	
not	 allowed	 to	 reach	 restructuring	 agreements	 with	
debtors	 outside	 formal	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 Tax	




er	 the	 debtor	 has	 prospects	 of	 recovery	 and	 is	 only	
experiencing	 liquidity	 problems.	 The	 law	 should	 re-
duce	 the	 guarantees	 generally	 required	 to	 postpone	









gaging	 in	 negotiations	 to	 reach	 out-of-court	 agree-
ments.	 The	 improvement	 of	 this	 organizational	 ele-
ment	 would	 be	 a	 key	 measure	 to	 facilitate	 business	
rescue	of	MSMEs.	
• Agreements	 reached	 out	 of	 court	 should	 be	 at	 least	
treated	 as	 tax	 neutral.	 Taxing	 these	operations	 often	
poses	 severe	 hurdles	 to	 business	 recovery	 and	 the	
provision	of	new	finance	for	the	debtor.	





proceedings	 brings	 about	 an	 unavoidable	 reputational	 damage	
and	an	increase	in	the	perception	of	risk	by	third	parties.	Absolute	
priority	of	all	post-commencement	claims,	an	adequate	system	of	
effects	 on	 executory	 contracts,	 or	 the	 presence	 and	 good	man-
agement	of	an	insolvency	representative	will	not	always	be	suffi-
cient	to	convince	suppliers	and	operational	creditors	to	continue	
to	 provide	 commercial	 credit.	 Additional	 measures	 might	 be	
needed.		
A	 possibility	 would	 be	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 public	 fund	 to	 support	
trade	 creditors	 whose	 claims	 arise	 after	 the	 commencement	 of	
insolvency	 proceedings.	 The	 fund	would	 not	 be	 providing	 direct	
financing,	but	rather,	guarantee	the	provision	of	credit	by	private	
sector	stakeholders:	either	directly	to	trade	suppliers	or	to	finan-
cial	 institutions	 that	 are	 willing	 to	 finance	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
business.	Clearly,	this	type	of	support	would	only	follow	a	careful	
assessment	of	the	viability	of	the	project.	It	could	be	directly	con-












the	 debtor´s	 situation	with	 regard	 to	 its	 creditors	will	 be	mainly	
ruled	by	the	content	of	the	plan.	New	financing	ought	to	be	more	
simple,	 since	 the	business	will	 have	normally	 been	 restructured,	
often	 downsized,	 and	 always,	 at	 least	 in	 theory,	 improved.	 Pre-
existing	debts	will	have	been	restructured,	and	hence	the	financial	
burden	will	be	lighter.	New	financing	debts	(by	trade	creditors,	or	
new	 financial	 facilities)	will	 be	 payable	 as	 they	 fall	 due,	 and	 the	
insolvency	law	should	include	a	rule	that	protects	the	preferential	
treatment	 of	 financing	 debts	 arisen	 during	 the	 implementation	
stage	in	case	of	failure	of	the	plan.	 In	order	to	underpin	the	suc-





so	 as	 not	 to	 cause	 damage	 to	 other	 businesses	 competing	with	
the	previously	insolvent	debtor.		
The	 former	 considerations	 for	 stage	 III	 refer	 to	 the	 implementa-
tion	stage	of	a	plan;	but	the	need	for	new	financing	and	the	ena-
bling	 framework	must	 also	 exist	 following	 the	 liquidation	 of	 the	
assets	 in	 case	 of	 sole	 entrepreneurs.	 Access	 to	 finance	 is	 para-
mount	 for	 a	 second	 chance.	 Suitable	 financing	 solutions	 for	 re-
entrepreneurs	need	to	be	put	in	place.	Re-starting	entrepreneurs	
need	capital,	cash	flow	and	credit,	with	few,	if	any,	restrictions	on	
future	 trade,	 without	 being	 encumbered	 with	 long	 repayment	
periods	of	debts	captured	by	a	bankruptcy	proceeding.	Distinction	
between	 honest	 and	 dishonest	 entrepreneurs	 should	 translate	











while	 simultaneously	 avoiding	any	preferential	 treatment	of	 "re-
born"	 entrepreneurs,	 as	 it	 may	 lead	 to	 unfair	 competition	 and	
moral	hazard.	




Lending	 to	 distressed	 business	 should	 be	 a	 possibility.	 It	 is	 not	
uncommon	 that	 banking	 law	 rules	 on	 corporate	 governance	 in-
clude	 limits	 to	 the	 bank	 and	 personal	 sanctions	 to	 directors	 of	
financial	 institutions	 that	 lend	 to	debtors	 that	are	unlikely	 to	 re-








and	 scope	 of	 permissible	 hedging	 through	 credit	 default	 swaps	
and	other	derivatives,	 still	 allowing	 financial	 institutions	 to	man-






• Efficacy	 across	 the	 population	 of	 MSME	 debtors:	
Guarantees	are	taken	in	 large	part	precisely	to	hedge	
against	 the	 principal	 debtor’s	 insolvency.	 Tampering	
with	a	category	of	guarantees	in	bankruptcy	proceed-




• Family	 destitution:	 However,	 micro	 and	 small	 enter-
prises,	 and	 perhaps	 smaller	medium	 ones	 also,	 raise	
particular	issues	where	the	guarantor	is	the	entrepre-
neur	 him	 or	 herself	 or	 another	 natural	 person	 con-
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nected	 with	 him/her. 185 	Allowing	 guarantees	 to	 be	
called	 in	 without	 restriction	 might	 result	 in	 “family	
bankruptcy”,	leaving	an	entire	family	destitute.		
• Accordingly,	the	ex	ante	costs	of	restricting	the	utility	
of	 connected-person	 guarantors	 of	 MSME	 debtors	
have	to	be	carefully	balanced	against	the	ex	post	costs	
of	allowing	their	entirely	unrestricted	enforcement.	
• Guarantors	 benefit	 from	 creditor	 action	moratorium:	
It	may,	in	some	cases,	be	a	powerful	incentive	to	time-
ly	commencement	by	the	debtor,	and	would	create	a	






• Treatment	 of	 guarantees	 depends	 on	 an	 approved	
plan:	 Where	 a	 plan	 is	 approved	 that	 restructures	
and/or	 discharges	 the	 underlying	 liability,	 that	 does	
not	 in	 and	 of	 itself	 constitute	pro	 tanto	 discharge	 of	
the	 guarantor’s	 liability. 186 	The	 plan	 must	 explicitly	
provide	for	the	guarantor’s	discharge.	
• Fairness-based	 unenforceability?	 Should	 a	 court	 be	
able	 to	render	a	connected	natural	person	guarantee	
unenforceable	 on	 the	 presumption	 or	 establishment	
of	 undue	 influence,	 unconscionability,	 etc.?	 If	 so,	
should	 this	 decision	 be	 taken	 only	 in	 the	 principal	
debtor’s	 bankruptcy	 proceedings,	 rather	 than	 when-
















Employees	 are	 often	 the	 objects	 of	 specific	 regulation	 with	 re-
spect	to	their	claims	during	insolvency	proceedings.	A	study	of	the	
treatment	of	 employee	 claims	 in	 countries	 that	 are	members	 of	
the	 Organization	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	 Development	
(“OECD”)	found	most	countries	provide	some	form	of	preference	
for	 such	 claims	 within	 their	 insolvency	 regimes	 and	 many	 also	






Two	general	 justifications	 for	 the	separate	 treatment	of	employ-
ees	as	creditors	in	insolvency	proceedings	have	been	offered.	The	
first	 deals	 with	 the	 “weakness”	 of	 employees	 relative	 to	 other	
creditors,	 the	 second	 concerns	 their	 ability	 to	 effectively	 partici-
pate	in	the	insolvency	process.	With	respect	to	employees’	weak-
ness,	 commentators	have	pointed	 to	 the	 lack	of	evidence	 that	a	
risk	premium	for	the	extension	of	credit	is	part	of	their	compensa-
tion	and	to	the	problems	of	cognitive	and	volitional	deficiencies	in	

























entering	 into	 the	 employment	 contract.192	Finally,	 it	 has	 been	
pointed	out	that	employees	are	poor	risk	bearers	relative	to	other	
creditors,	 due	 to	 their	 lack	 of	 relevant	 financial	 information	 and	
inability	to	diversify	the	insolvency	risk	from	their	employment.193	
The	second	 issue	 is	that	 individual	employees	are	 ill	equipped	to	
effectively	 participate	 in	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 They	 lack	 both	
the	requisite	knowledge	and	access	to	legal	expertise.	Individually	
the	amount	of	their	claims	and	likely	recovery	would	not	pay	the	
expense	 entailed	 in	 effective	 participation.	 The	 expense	may	 be	
recoverable	 if	 a	 mechanism	 to	 pursue	 such	 claims	 collectively	
were	available.	
2. Employees	in	MSME	insolvencies	
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According	 to	 Industry	 Canada,	 only	 51%	 of	 small	 and	 medium	
sized	 enterprises	 survived	 more	 than	 5	 years.195	Thus,	 it	 would	
seem	that	employees	 in	such	businesses	are	subject	to	all	of	the	
conditions	previously	discussed	regarding	the	policy	 justifications	
for	specific	treatment	 in	countries’	 insolvency	regimes.	The	 issue	
is	how	best	to	ensure	that	the	policies	adopted	in	individual	coun-
tries	for	the	protection	of	employee	claims	are	effectively	applied	


















tion	of	 employees’	 unpaid	wage	 claims	when	an	 employer	 is	 in-
solvent,	with	most	using	some	form	of	 the	hybrid	system.196	The	
hybrid	system	has	the	advantage	of	providing	earlier	payment	of	
wages,	 while	 allowing	 for	 the	 efficient	 collectivization	 of	 wage	
claims	in	the	insolvency	proceeding	through	the	subrogation	pro-










plified	 Modular	 Approach	 to	 either	 liquidation	 or	 rescue.	 The	
problem	is	how	to	incorporate	existing	employee	protections	into	
the	revised	process.	For	example,	under	the	usual	insolvency	pro-
cess	where	 the	 insolvency	 professional	 is	 a	 key	 participant,	 one	
policy	 option	 that	 has	 been	 implemented	 is	 that	 the	 insolvency	
practitioner	in	the	MSME	insolvency	be	required	to:	calculate	the	
employees’	claims;	advise	the	employees’	of	their	rights	under	the	
applicable	 country’s	 insolvency	 and/or	 wage	 guarantee	 regime;	
advise	 the	 relevant	 guarantee	 organization	 of	 the	 claim	 where	
that	 type	 of	 protection	 is	 offered.197	The	 insolvency	 practitioner	
would	be	compensated	for	the	work	required	to	fulfill	these	obli-
gations.		
This	 procedure	would	 be	 consistent	with	 Convention	 173	 of	 the	
International	Labour	Organization:	Protection	of	Workers’	Claims	
(Employer	 Insolvency)	 1992	 which	 provides	 that	 countries	 that	
ratify	 the	 convention	 should	 provide	 protection	 for	 employee	










However,	 some	 parts	 of	 the	Modular	 Approach	 to	MSME	 insol-
vency	 in	 this	 report	 envisage	minimal	 involvement	 of	 insolvency	
professionals	 in	 the	 process.	 For	 the	 liquidation/discharge	mod-
ule,	the	debtor	employer	will	have	the	most	cost-efficient	access	
to	 the	 information	necessary	 to	 identify	 the	amount	and	type	of	
employee	 claims,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 information	 required	 to	 notify	




ruptcy	 discharge	 application.	 The	 collectivization	 of	 employee	
claims	 in	 the	 guarantee	 institution	 and	 their	 pursuit	 by	 it	 in	 the	
bankruptcy	would	provide	a	more	efficient	means	of	dealing	with	
these	 claims	 than	 their	 pursuit	 by	 individual	 employees.	 A	 dis-
charge	 conditional	 on	 the	 relevant	 institution’s	 satisfaction	 that	








exercised	 by	 the	 guarantee	 institution	 or	 the	 employees	 them-
selves,	and	their	interests	in	the	future	revenue	streams	generat-
ed	by	 the	continued	operation	of	 the	business	as	a	 result	of	 the	



















most	 vulnerable	 and	 disadvantaged	 creditors	 and	 provide	 a	
mechanism	to	comply	with	international	obligations	such	as	those	
in	the	EU	Directive	and	ILO	Convention.	
If	 the	business	 closes	without	any	 formal	 insolvency	proceeding,	
as	many	MSME	 enterprises	 do,	 then	 hopefully	 the	 country’s	 la-
bour	standards	regime	will	provide	some	effective	relief	for	those	
employees,	 but	 that	 eventuality	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 re-
port.	
	
